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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §
78-2-2(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. This Court should reverse the trial judge's determination as to the value of the
water system on grounds other than those impermissible by the Utah Supreme Court. The
standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard.
2. This Court should reverse the trial court'sfindingthat the 1977 Well Lease and
Water Transportation Agreement was a valid encumbrance on the water system on grounds
other than the PSC Order of March 17,1986. The standard of review is a legal correctness
standard.
CONSTITUTIONAL, PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules pertinent to the
resolution of the issues presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a lawsuit originally filed by Plaintiff Hi-Countiy Estates
Homeowners Association on March 8, 1985. After convoluted proceedings in the lower
court, Homeowners appealed certain decisions by the trial judge as outlined more
specifically in the Statement of Facts, infra. After proceedings before the Utah Court of
Appeals, and subsequently the Utah Supreme Court, the appeal was referred back to this
Court by the Utah Supreme Court.
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Homeowners subsequentlyfiledtheir "Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion to Decide Certain
Appeal Issues on Other Grounds" on December 7, 1995. Foothills Water Company
(hereafter "Foothills") filed a response to Homeowners' Motion, and Homeowners
subsequently filed a reply to Foothills' response. This Court then subsequently issued an
Order requiring full briefing of the issues involved in Homeowners' Motion. See greater
details in Statement of Facts, infra.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On March 8,1985, Homeowners filed the instant action (R. 2-17). Homeowners
subsequently filed a Second Amended Complaint (March 16,1987) asking the Court to quiet
title and/or issue a declaratory judgment declaring the rights and responsibilities of
Homeowners with respect to ownership of a water system, water lots, a waterrightand the
real estate and easements related thereto, which serves Hi-Countiy Estates Subdivision
Phase I in southwestern Salt Lake County. (R. 296-304).
2. Defendant-Appellees Foothills Water Company (hereafter "Foothills") and Dansie
answered Homeowners' Second Amended Complaint on March 21, 1987, and counterclaimed against Counter-Claim Defendants Sims and Turner for slander of title and against
Homeowners to quiet title to the water right, water system and components in Foothills
Water Company. Dansie and Foothills alsofileda Cross-Claim against Defendants Spencer
and Lewton for slander of title (R. 341-352).
3. Homeowners replied to the Dansie and Foothills Counterclaims on July 9, 1987
(R. 371-373).
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4. Charles E. Lewton and Keith Spencer, two of the original developers of HiCountiy Estates Subdivision Phase I, having chosek to disclaim their interest in any of the
property involved, allowed judgment to be taken against them. (R. 897, 902, 904). The
same was true of Defendants Hi-Countiy Estates, Inc., and Hi-Countiy Estates Second (R.
897, 902, 903). No appeals were taken by any of these parties. Defendant J. Rodney
Dansie participated in the lower court but failed to appeal from any of the Court's Orders
in this case. All unknown persons claiming an interest in Hi-Country Estates Subdivision
were served pursuant to an Order Authorizing Service of Summons by Publication entered
on March 23,1987, by the Honorable David B. Dee (R. 312, 313). Proof of Publication was
presented to the Court on or about May 1, 1987 (R. 340). Therefore, the only parties
against whom title was not quieted in this case were Foothills and Gerald H. Bagley and
Bagley & Company.
5. Trial began on August 25,1988. On that date, the Court entered a Minute Entry
stating:
"This matter comes on before the Court for trial, with appearances as shown above. The Plaintiffs and Defendants' counsel
meet with the Court in chambers, and opening remarks are
therefore waived. Thereupon, the Plaintiff calls Marge Tempest
and she is sworn and examined. The respective counsel then
agreed to submit the matter via written proffer. The matter will
be further argued on September 9,1988, at 1:00 p.m." (Emphasis supplied).
(R. 452).
6. The Court's decision of October 25, 1988, was embodied in an "Order on
Ownership Issues" signed by Judge Brian on October 20, 1989 (R. 895-898). At that time,
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the Court also signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 899-904), but left open
the issue of fair compensation for the water system.
7. On December 1,1989, Homeowners filed a "Trial Brief and Motion for Summary
Judgment on Valuation Issue", claiming that the Court was bound by the determination of
the Public Service Commission of Utah as to the improvements to the subject water system
between 1974 and 1985, which the Court ruled was the period of time for which
improvements to the system should be valued. (R. 1023-1043).
8. In a Minute Entry of January 31, 1990, the Court denied Homeowner's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on the valuation issue and scheduled a trial to "determine
fair compensation" (R. 1228).
9. Trial was held on the valuation issue on July 30, 31, and August 1,1990 (R. 13581362; R. 1953-2404). Several expert witnesses on valuation were called by both parties.
10. On August 16,1990, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision (R. 1538-1543),
which was embodied in formal Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and "Order Regarding
Amount Payable by Plaintiff for Subject Water System" dated October 31, 1990 (R. 16201628).
11. At that time, and not on the record, despite a request for the matter to be on
the record by the parties, Judge Brian granted the oral motion of Foothills and Bagley to
amend his previous Order dated October 31,1990, with a ruling that if Homeowners failed
to pay the sum of $98,500.00 by August 15, 1991, an Order Quieting Title to the water
system would be entered in the name of Foothills Water Company (R. 1647).
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12. On February 5, 1991, the trial judge signed the document entitled "Order on
Motions to Certify Order as Final and Clarification of Order" in which he ruled among
other things:
If the sum of $98,500.00 required to be paid to Foothills Water
Company in paragraph 3 of the Order Regarding Amount
Payable by Plaintiff for subject water system, dated October 31,
1990, is not paid in full to Foothills Water Company on or
before August 15, 1991, an Order Quieting Title to the water
system within the boundaries of Hi-Countiy Estates Subdivision
Phase I and the water right represented by Application No.
33130 (59-1608) on file with the Utah State Department of
Natural Resources, Division of Water Rights, and the Utah
State Engineer's Office, in Foothills Water Company shall be
entered forthwith.
(R. 1647-1649).
13. On August 20, 1991, Judge Brian issued his "Quiet Title Order in Favor of
Foothills Water Company", finding that Homeowners had failed to pay the $98,500.00 on
or before August 15, 1991, as required by his Order of October 31, 1990 (R. 1931-1936).
14. On August 22, 1991, Homeowners filed its Notice of Appeal in this matter (R.
1944-46).
15. Foothills and Bagley filed their Notice of Cross-Appeal in this matter on
September 18, 1991 (R. 1947-48).
16. After a full hearing and oral argument in the Utah Court of Appeals, the Court
of Appeals issued its Opinion in this matter on September 22, 1993. That opinion was a
unanimous decision written by the Honorable Regnal W. Garff, Judge. The opinion ruled
in Respondent Homeowners Association's favor on every single issue. The Court stated in
its "Conclusion":
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In conclusion, we (1) affirm the district court's initial conclusion that Homeowners Association holds legal title to the water
right, lots and system; (2) remand for the court to issue a quiet
title order in Homeowners Association's favor with no contingencies; (3) affirm the court's conclusion that Bagley is not
entitled to any damages; (4) affirm the court's conclusion that
Foothills Water Company's claim for slander of title be
dismissed; (5) reverse the court's order denying summary
judgment on the issue of compensation, acknowledging the
PSC's order that the amount of $16,334.99 is includable in the
rate base; (6) reverse the district court's order regarding the
validity of the well lease agreement; and (7) reverse the court's
order regarding distribution of water to outsiders, acknowledging the PSC's jurisdiction over that issue.
Slip Op. at 18, 19. (See Addendum 1).
17. Foothills petitioned the Utah Court of Appeals for Rehearing pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure on October 13, 1993.
18.

The Utah Court of Appeals denied Foothills' Petition for Rehearing on

December 7, 1993.
19. Foothills was the only Defendant which petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for
certiorari. The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals issued September 22, 1993, is final
as to all parties except Homeowners and Foothills.
20. The Utah Supreme Court granted Foothills' Petition for Writ of Certiorari in
part on June 13, 1994. The Supreme Court entry related the following simple single
sentence "[T]|he petition for writ of certiorari is granted only as to the jurisdiction of the
Public Service Commission." See Addendum 2. In doing so, the Utah Supreme Court, of
necessity, upheld this Court's decision of September 22,1993, as that decision related to this
Court's determinations as follows: (1) affirming the district court's initial conclusion that
Homeowners Association holds legal title to the water right, lots and system; (2) remanding
6

the case for the trial court to issue a Quiet Title Order in Homeowners' favor with no
contingencies; (3) affirming the district court's conclusion that Bagley was not entitled to any
damages; and (4) affirming the district court's conclusion that Foothills Water Company's
claim for slander of title should be dismissed. (See Addendum 2).
21. The Utah Supreme Court issued its opinion after briefing and oral argument on
July 20, 1995, (1) reversing the Court of Appeals reversal of the district court's denial of
Homeowners' Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of the amount of reimbursement
owed to Foothills Water Company (which had been based on the PSC's decision); (2)
reversing the Court of Appeals' determination that the Public Service Commission's Order
of March 17,1986, invalidated the 1977 Well Lease Agreement between Bagley and Dansie;
(see Addendum 3 pg. 10); (3) ruled that the Court of Appeals' reversal of an Order of the
district court which permitted Foothills to transfer water through the system to customers
within its service area, but outside of the subdivision, was moot based upon the subsequent
decertification of Foothills by the Public Service Commission. (See Addendum 3 pg. 4, n.
3).
22. This matter was remitted to the Utah Court of Appeals on September 26, 1995,
for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court opinion. (See Addendum 4).
23.

Homeowners filed its Motion to Decide Certain Appeal Issues on Other

Grounds on December 7, 1995.

Foothills responded to Plaintiffs Motion with its

Memorandum on January 5,1996. Homeowners then filed its Reply to Foothills Response
to Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion to Decide Certain Appeal Issues on Other Grounds on
January 18, 1996.
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24. This Court issued its "Order on Briefing" on February 8, 1996, requiring the
parties to address the issues of (1) whether the district court correctly determined the fair
market value of the water right, system and lots was $98,500.00 under the theoiy of
unjustment enrichment, and (2) whether the district court correctly held that the Well Lease
Agreement was a valid and binding encumbrance on the water system. The Court also
asked the parties to address subissues which included whether the Utah Supreme Court's
opinion required affirmance of the district court's ruling on fair market value of the water
right, system and lots, and the validity of the Well Lease as an encumbrance on the system,
and whether the Well Lease Agreement is a valid and binding encumbrance on the system,
and in conjunction therewith, whether the Well Lease Agreement has lapsed.

(See

Addendum 9).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

While it is true that the Utah Supreme Court has reversed this Court's

determination that the trial judge should have granted the valuation urged upon it by
Homeowners as found by the Public Service Commission, Homeowners urge this Court to
consider the other issues presented in its original briefe before this Court, and in the instant
brief, as to why Homeowners should not be required to pay the sum of $98,500.00 as
compensation to Foothills for the water system, water right, and water lots in question. This
water system was paid for by Homeowners when they purchased their lots in the subdivision
and was a legitimate part of the purchase price for those lots. Homeowners should thus be
required to pay nothing to Foothills, but if they were required to pay anything, Homeowners
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assert that they should pay no more than the sum of $27,650.00 as testified to by its expert
in this case.
2. Homeowners further urge this Court to reverse the decision of the trial judge
regarding the eternal encumbrance on this water system found to be valid by the trial judge
based upon the 1977 Well Lease and Water Transportation Agreement. That Agreement
expired on its face on April 10, 1987, and cannot possibly constitute a valid and legal
encumbrance on this water system. Furthermore, Homeowners were not a party to this
agreement and have never been consulted regarding it, yet they are the ones who eternally
must bear the burden of this agreement by providing free water to the Dansie family
pursuant to the trial judge's initial decision. This decision by the trial judge should be
reversed on these grounds, rather than the grounds originally found by the Court in this
case, which was subsequently reversed by the Utah Supreme Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL JUDGE'S
DETERMINATION AS TO THE VALUE OF THE WATER
SYSTEM ON GROUNDS OTHER THAN THOSE FOUND
IMPERMISSIBLE BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT.
Although the Utah Supreme Court found that this Court's determination that the
value of the water system, water right and lots in this case could not be based upon a
decision by the Public Service Commission (which occurred March 17, 1986), it is the
position of Homeowners that this Court should reverse the trial judge's determination that
Homeowners should pay $98,500.00 for the water system, water right and lots in question
on other grounds as argued in its original brief before this Court. In that brief, dated
9

August 10, 1992, and which is a part of the appellate record in this matter, Homeowners
argued that the Public Service Commission Order regarding the valuation of the water
system should have been adopted by the trial court. Although this Court agreed, the Utah
Supreme Court has reversed on that issue and held simply that". . . the Court of Appeals
erred in reversing the district court's denial of the Homeowners Association's Motion for
Summary Judgment on the issue of the amount of reimbursement owed to the Water
Company and in ordering the district court to defer to the P.S.C." (See Addendum 3, pg.
7, 8). The Utah Supreme Court did not hold that the amount of $98,500.00 was the amount
which Homeowners should be required to pay in this matter, but only found that the amount
of $16,334.99, ordered by this Court, could not be upheld on the basis upon which this
Court upheld it, i.e., a decision by the Public Service Commission of March 17, 1986. The
Supreme Court found that the Public Service Commission's Order only determined the value
of the water system for purposes of rate-making and not for any other purpose.
In its initial brief before this Court, Homeowners argued not only that the value
should be set at no more than $16,334.99 pursuant to the Public Service Commission
determination, but also argued that the amount of $98,500.00 was an unfair and arbitrary
amount chosen by the trial judge. Homeowners argued on pages 12-25 of its opening brief
to the Court of Appeals in this matter that (1) Homeowners should not have been required
to pay for the water right; (2) Homeowners have already paid for the water system and
should not be required to pay a second time; (3) the water system in this case has little
value to anyone but Homeowners, but at any rate is worth no more than $27,650.00.
Homeowners' arguments in that regard are reproduced in Addendum 5 attached to this
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brief. Those arguments are not repeated, but the Court is requested to review those
arguments and use them as a basis for reversing the trial court's determination that
Homeowners should pay Foothills $98,500.00 as compensation in this matter.
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURTS
FINDING THAT THE 1977 WELL LEASE AND WATER
TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT WAS A VALID ENCUMBRANCE ON THE WATER SYSTEM ON GROUNDS OTHER
THAN THE PSC ORDER OF MARCH 17. 1986.
In its decision reversing this Court with regard to the 1977 Well Lease Agreement,
the Supreme Court again focused on the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission and
ruled that ". . . The PSC did not have jurisdiction to invalidate the 1977 Well Lease
Agreement as long as that agreement did not impact the rates paid by the Homeowners
Association. Although the PSC has power to construe contracts effecting matters within its
jurisdiction such as rate-making, ordinary contracts unrelated to such matters are outside
of the purview of PSC jurisdiction." (See Addendum 3, pg. 10).
Therefore, although the Utah Supreme Court reversed this Court's decision reversing
the trial court in finding that the 1977 Well Lease Agreement was a valid encumbrance on
the water system, it did so only on the basis that this Court relied on the March 17, 1986
decision of the Public Service Commission as grounds for such invalidation. It is the
argument of Homeowners that this Court should now proceed to determine whether or not
the 1977 Well Lease Agreement should be invalidated on other grounds argued originally
by Homeowners in its briefs before this Court, which resulted in this Court's September 22,
1993, opinion.
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Homeowners argued on pages 42 through 47 of its initial brief (See Addendum 7)
and pages 40 through 43 of its Consolidated Reply Brief and Cross-Appellee's Brief (See
Addendum 8) before this Court that this 1977 Well Lease and Water Transportation
Agreement, attached as Addendum 15 to its opening brief before this Court and admitted
into evidence in the trial of the matter as Plaintiffs Exhibit 11 (R. 1359, 1857-1867) (See
Addendum 6 to this Memorandum), was invalid not only because the Public Service
Commission found that it was "grossly unreasonable" and "showering virtually limitless
benefits on Jessie Dansie and the members of his immediate family," but also because this
agreement terminated on its face on April 10, 1987, and was never renewed. Since the
agreement terminated by its own terms on that date, and no extensions of the agreement
were ever submitted, it cannot be a valid basis for an encumbrance upon this water system
"for time and all eternity" as essentially ruled by the trial judge in this case.
Furthermore, Homeowners argued before this Court that they were not parties to this
agreement; and to impose its "grossly unreasonable" terms upon them would be unfair and
unjust, because they are the persons the Agreement was supposed to have benefited in the
first place.
Homeowners also argued that the Well Lease and Water line Extension Agreement
itself provides in paragraph F.2 "Bagley will be personally responsible for lease terms and
conditions if Assignee fails to meet the terms and conditions of the lease. No assignment,
conveyance or sublease shall release Bagley from liabilities and obligations under this
agreement." (See Addendum 7 pg. 45).

12

Homeowners also argued in its opening and reply briefs in this matter that the trial
court had failed to enter adequatefindingsregarding its decision that the 1977 Well Lease
Agreement should be a valid and fully binding encumbrance on the water system as long as
the water system "exists and is operative." Homeowners pointed out that the Court had also
indicated in its Finding of Fact on this issue that "that encumbrance does not in any way
legally burden the water system or the owner or operator of the water system." Homeowners argued that this Finding of Fact is internally inconsistent and thus incomprehensible.
Furthermore, Homeowners argued that Finding of Fact No. 5 (the Finding of Fact referred
to herein) is not a legitimate Finding of Fact, but constituted a Conclusion of Law.
Homeowners pointed out that the Conclusion of Law reached by the Court on this subject
seemed inconsistent with its Finding of Fact No. 5. In that Conclusion of Law, the judge
referred to a water right, but the 1977 Well Lease Agreement nowhere mentions a water
right. It is the lease of a well! (See Addendum 7 and 8).
CONCLUSION
While it is true that the Utah Supreme Court has reversed this Court's determination
that the trial judge should have granted the valuation urged upon it by Homeowners as
found by the Public Service Commission, Homeowners urge this Court to consider the other
issues presented in its original briefs before this Court as to why Homeowners should not
be required to pay the sum of $98,500.00 as compensation to Foothills for the water system,
water right and water lots in question. This water system was paid for by homeowners when
they purchased their lots in the subdivision and was a legitimate part of the purchase price
for those lots. Homeowners should thus be required to pay nothing to Foothills, but if they

13

were required to pay anything, Homeowners assert that they should pay no more than the
sum of $27,650.00 as testified to by its expert in this case.
Furthermore, Homeowners urge this Court to reverse the decision of the trial judge
regarding the eternal encumbrance on this water system found to be valid by the trial judge
based upon the 1977 Well Lease and Water Transportation Agreement. That agreement
expired on its face on April 10, 1987, and cannot possibly constitute a valid and legal
encumbrance on this water system. Furthermore, Homeowners were not a party to this
agreement and have never been consulted regarding it, yet they are the ones who eternally
must bear the burden of this agreement by providing free water to the Dansie family
pursuant to the trial judge's initial decision. This decision by the trial judge should be
reversed on these grounds, rather than the grounds originally found by this Court in this
case.
It is to be emphasized that the Utah Supreme Court, in reversing this Court's
opinion, dealt only with two issues relating to the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission. The Supreme Court did not uphold the trial judge's decision, but merely
reversed this Court's basis for reversing the trial judge as to the two issues discussed herein.
This Court must make a decision, before it remands the case to the trial court, as to
whether or not the other grounds presented by Homeowners for invalidation of this Well
Lease Agreement are valid before it can uphold the trial judge's decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /

day of April, 1996.

__________

_
]R. KELLEk
Atto^ey/for PlaintiffyAppellants
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Val R. Antczak
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Foothills Water Company
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ADDENDUM 1

Utah Court of Appeals

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

SEP 2 2 1993

IN TEE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
——ooOoo—-

Hi-Country Estates Homeowners
A s s o c i a t i o n , a Utah,
corporation ,
P l a i n t i f f , Appellant, and
Cross-Appellee,
v.
Baclev S Company, a Utah
corporation; J. Rodney Dansie;
Gerald Baclav: Hi-Country
Estates, Inc., a dissolved
Utah corporation; Keith
Spencer; Charles E. Lewton;
and unknown persons claiming
an i n t e r e s t in Hi-Country
Estates Subdivision,
Defendants, Appellees,
and Cross-Appellants.

•/•
/

MaiyT.Moown
Cane at tfc* Court

OPINION
(For Publication)
Case No. 920450-CA
F I L E D
(September 22, 1993)

F o o t h i l l s Water Company, a
Utah corporation,
Counterclaimant,
Appellee, and CrossAppellant,
v.
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners
Association, a Utah
corporation; W. Norman Sims;
and William P. Turner,
Counterclaim Defendants,
and Acoellees.

Third District, Salt LaJce County
The Honorable Pat 3. 3rian
Attorneys:

Larry R. Keller, Salt LaJce" City, for Appellants
Ralph J. Marsh, Val R. AntczaJc, and T. Patrick Casey,
for Appellees

Before Judges Garff,1 Greenwood, and Orme.
GARFF, Judge:
Appellant Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association
(Homeowners Association) appeals from a final order, which
ultimately granted quiet title to a water system, water right,
and property lot in favor of appellee Foothills Water Company,
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand in part.
FACTS
We draw the facts from the parties' stipulated statement of
facts, which the court adopted in its findings of fact.
In 1970, appellee, Gerald H. Bagley purchased the
undeveloped real property involved in this action from Tony and
Bette Lou Nicolerti pursuant to a deferred-payment contract.
Also in 1970, Bagley, Charles E. Lewnon, and others formed HiCountry Estates, Inc., a Utah corporation. This corporation,
which was involuntarily dissolved in 1976, was the general
partner for Hi-Country Estates, Second. Bagley later assigned
his contract with the Nicolettis to Hi-Country Estates, Second, a
limited partnership, in which he was one of the partners. Later
in 1970, the Hi-Country Estates, Second partnership, along with
Zions First National Bank Trust Department and the Nicolettis,
entered into an agreement under which the bank would take title
to the property, remit payment on the contract to the Nicolettis,
and thereafter deed the property to purchasers of lots within the
subdivision. The partnership subdivided the property into the
Hi-Country Estates Subdivision. The partnership installed a
water system to supply water to the subdivision, and then
commenced to sell lots to the public.
In 1971, Bagley and the other partners sold their interests
in the project to Lewton and withdrew from the project. Keith
Spencer later joined Lewton as an owner and manager of the
project.
In 1973 and 1974, Lewton and Spencer sold the water system,
along with all unsold lots in the subdivision, back to Bagley,
who then resumed operation of the water system. Bagley made
substantial repairs and capital improvements to the system,
including constructing a second storage tank, adding pumps and
lines, replacing booster lines, and in 1977, connecting the
1. Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff, sitting by special appointment
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (1992).
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system to an additional well leased from Jesse J. Dansie (the
Glazier Weil Water Right).
From 1972 to October 1985, Bagley operated and maintained
the water system in the capacity of (1) an individual, or (2) a
general partner of 3agiey and Company, or (2) a limited partner
of Foothills Water Company. During those years, he incurred
total cash losses of $487,510.00 in operating, maintaining, and
improving the water system. In 1976, Hi-Country Estates, Inc.
was involuntarily dissolved.
In 1977, 3agiey entered into a well lease agreement with
Jesse J. Dansie to supply water from the Dansie well to the water
system. This lease provided that Dansie and his family would
continue to receive water from the well, as long as the system
was operable. The lease provided that it could be renewed on 11
April" 10, 1987 "on terms to be agreed to by Bagley and Dansie.
In 1982, Hcmecwners Association received tax notices from
Salt LaJce County requesting payment of delinquent and current
taxes on the water system. Homeowners Association forwarded
these notices to Bagley with a letter stating it did not own the
water system and thus Bagley was responsible for the taxes. In.
1984, Bagley paid $15,000.00 in delinquent taxes to redeem the
system, after the county had scheduled a tax sale. Even though
Bagley paid the taxes, the county issued the tax deed to the two
water tank lots in the name of Homeowners Association.
In Marcn 1985, Hcmecwners Association brought an action to
quiet title in the water system, the Glazier Well Water Right,
and the two water tanic lots. Bagley counterciaimed, praying for
reimbursement of all sums expended in the construction and
installation of the water system and all costs and expenses w
incurred in the operation and maintenance of the water system in
the event [Homeowners Association] is found to be the owners of
the water system." 3agiey adopted one of the association's
alternative theories: that he acted as a constructive trustee or
resulting trustee of the disputed property.
In the same action, Foothills Water Company sought damages
for slander of title from Spencer, Lewton, Homeowners
Association, and from W. Norman Sims and William P. Turner,
members of the association. It also sought damages similar to
those sought by Bagley. The trial court dismissed Foothills
Water Company's claim
for slander of title on October 20, 1989,
for "lack of proof.11
In June of 1985, Turner asked J.R. Moss, a trust officer of
Zions BanJc to prepare a quit-claim deed to the two water tank
parcels on the property with Homeowners Association as a grantee.
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Ke also asked Moss to request quit-claim deeds from Spencer and
Lewton, former officers of the~defunct Hi-Country Estates, Inc.
and of Hi-Country Estates, Second. Moss prepared the deeds for
the tank lots for Zicns's signature and had them recorded. Moss
prepared other quit-claim deeds and forwarded them to Spencer and
Lewton, who signed them on behalf of Hi-Country Estates, Inc. and
Hi-Country Estates, Second, and returned them to Moss, who had
them recorded.
On October 21, 1985, Bagley transferred ownership of the
water system to Dansie in lieu of payment of sums due him on a
previous obligation. This transfer was made via Bagley executing
an assignment transferring ail the outstanding stock of Foothills
Water Company to Dansie.
In January 1586, in a Public Service Commission (PSC)
hearing regarding rats base, Homeowners Association argued that
Foothills Water Company should not include the cost of the water
system as a capital investment in its rate base. The PSC
determined that only a small portion of the water company's
capital investment could be included in the utility's rate base,
pending resolution of the ownership dispute in district court.
At the same time, Homeowners Association agreed to pay the
property 'taxes on the water system directly, in part to avoid
those taxes being included as an expense in setting water rates.2
On March 17, 1586, the PSC issued a final report and order,
determining the extent- to which the improvements in the- water
system could be included in the rate base. Those findings
included: (1) "Bagley was selling lots at a profit until 1976;"
(2) "the improvements made between 1977 and 1980 were to have
been provided by Sagley as part of the original system;" and (3)
only $15,234.99 of the improvements were includable in the rate
base as legitimate costs of improvement to the system.
Trial in the district court on the issue of ownership began
August 25, 1988. The court conferred with counsel off the
record, asking them to stipulate to some of the facts and proffer
evidence pertaining to the disputed issues.
The parties then agreed to brief the issues and submit them
for decision. The court set the due date for briefs for noon on
September 9, 1988, and' it set oral argument on the matter for

2. The Utah Supreme Court has previously affirmed that local
taxes may be passed on to consumers by way of the rate base. See
Mountain States Tel, and Tel. Co, .v. Salt Lake Citv. 596 P.2d
649, 651 (Utah 1979}.
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1:00 p.m. the same day. This hearing was continued several
times. It was finally held October 25, 1983.
At the August 25, 1988 hearing, Foothills Water Company's
counsel mentioned a "potential n&&d for witnesses." The court
responded that counsel should notify the court "by a telephonic
conference if it appears that there are proffered facts that
cannot be stipulated to." The court noted it would render an
••opinion on the record, not in the form of a memorandum
decision." It then released all witnesses. The court noted that
counsel should contact the court via telephonic conference in the
event "problems arise in any way."
On October 14, 1988, Homeowners Association, Foothills Water
Company, and Bagley filed a stipulated statement of undisputed
facts and disputed contentions." To support its position
regarding the*disputed issues, Foothills Water Company prepared
and submitted an extensive set of proffers of witness testimony.
The other parties did not file any proffers.
After several postponements, hearing on the issue of
ownership was held October 25, 1988. The court determined that
Homeowners Association "is the legal owner of the disputed water
system." The court made findings supporting this conclusion
based on the parties' stipulated statement of facts and the
exhibits attached thereto. The court's findings did not adopt
any of the facts or theories set forth in Foothills Water
Company's proffers. The court concluded that it would quiet
title in favor of the association "only upon payment in full by
[Homeowners Association] to [Foothills'Water Company] of the
Court's reimbursement order for improvements by [Foothills Water
Company] to [Homeowners Association's! water system for the years
1974 to 1985."
In determining that Homeowners Association owned the water
system, rights, and lot, the court relied on the following
documents:
Two 1975 quitclaim deeds from Hi-Country
Estates, Inc., and Hi-Country Estate Second,*
to [Homeowners Association], those deeds
conveying all common areas in the subdivision
to [Homeowners Association].
A 1984 recorded tax deed from Salt Lake
County to [Homeowners Association] conveying
all the water tank lots in the disputed
subdivision to [Homeowners Association].
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A 1985 recorded deed from Hi-Country
Estates, Inc., to [Homeowners Association],
conveying the water tank lots to [Homeowners
Association]•
A 1985 recorded deed from Hi-Country
Estates Second to [Homeowners Association],
conveying the water tank lots to [Homeowners
Association].
Two 1985 recorded quitclaim deeds from
Zicns Bank and Trust, trustee for the
property in the subdivision, to [Homeowners
Association], conveying the water tank lots
to [Homeowners Association].
An assignment from Hi-Country Estates,
Inc., to [Homeowners Association], of the
disputed water rights.
An acknowledgment by the State
Engineer's Division of Water Rights that
[Homeowners Association] is owner of the
water rights, more specifically, water right
referred to in this action as the Glazier
Well Water Right,
After ruling from the bench, the court suggested that the
parties attempt to stipulate to the amount due Foothills Water
Company. "If you are unable to do that, the court will schedule
an evidentiary hearing, take testimony, and make the decision on
the matter."
When asked about unaddressed issues such as the
counterclaims, attorney fees, and other issues, the court
responded that it would take such issues under advisement, hoping
that in the mean time, the parties would attempt to resolve those
issues "with the umbrella issue of reasonable reimbursement•"
The court then set a time for an evidentiary hearing for the
issue of reimbursement.
The court's ruling from the October 25, 1988 hearing was set
forth in findings of fact and conclusions of law, signed October
20, 1989 by the court and approved by counsel for the parties.
Regarding the October 25, 1988 hearing on the issue of ownership,
the court noted that "any objections to the content of the
Court's ruling on the resulting findings, conclusions and order
shall be addressed in a motion for reconsideration of such
ruling, findings, conclusions and order and not as objections to
form.n
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Accordingly, on October 30, 1989, Foothills Water Company
moved the court to reconsider, or to set aside the order on the
basis that the proceedings did not afford it due process, did not
present it with an opportunity to properly present its position
according to the rules of civil procedure and of evidence, and
did not comport with the method agreed upon- Foothills Water
Company also claimed that the findings and order were not
supported by sufficient evidence.
Further, on December 1, 1989, Homeowners Association moved
that the court recognize and be bound by the PSC's determination
regarding the value of the improvements to the water system made
between 1974 and 1985.
The court heard Foothills Water Company's motions on
December 28, 1989, and issued an order denying them and restating
that its October 20, 1989 order would be the final order of the
court regarding ownership. The court held that Foothills Water
Company had waived its right to an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of ownership because it never contacted the court to
arrange such a hearing as contemplated in the court's directive
from the bench during the August* 25, 1988 hearing.
On January 8, 1990, Foothills Water Company and Dansie again
moved for reconsideration or for amendment of the court's
previous findings, conclusions, and order. On January 17, 1990;
the court again reiterated its prior order of October 20, 1989.
On January 31, 1990, the court scheduled a trial to
"determine fair compensation. " After several delays, an
evidentiary hearing was held July 30, 31, and August 1, 1990, to
determine the amount of reimbursement due Foothills Water
Company. Evidence was submitted showing that Bagley, since
taking the water system bacJc in 1974, had spent 5227,851.00 on
capital improvements to the water system and had incurred
5250,659.00 in operating losses while operating the system for
the benefit of Homeowners Association. The evidence regarding
the present value of the system was disputed.
On August 16, 1990, the court issued its memorandum
decision, later embodied in formal findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and order "regarding amount payable by [Homeowners
Association] for subject water system," dated October 31, 1990.
The court ruled that the Dansie well lease agreement was a valid
and binding encumbrance on the water system. The court also held
that Bagley was not entitled to any compensation for operating
losses and capital improvements relating to the water system,
primarily because he had assigned ail his rights to Foothills
Water Company.
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The court found that the "water system . . . and the water
right at: issue . . . , including improvements made, property
taxes paid, repairs to the system and operating losses, have a
combined net value of $93,500." The court ordered Homeowners
Association to pay Foothills Water Company $98,500.00 for the
value of the water system before it would enter the quiet title
order. The court ordered the association to pay the sum by no
later than August 15, 1991, with the unpaid balance being
interest free*
On October 21, 1990, the parties met with the judge for an
informal conference regarding a motion to certify the courts
orders as final. At that time, and not on the record, despite
the parties' request for the matter to be on the record,3 the
judge granted the oral motion of Foothills Water Company and
3agley zo amend its previous order dated October 21, 1990. The
court ruled that in the event Homeowners Association failed to
pay the sum of $98,500.00 by August 15, 1991, the court would
then enrer an order quiering title to the water system in favor
of Foothills Water Company. The court formally entered this
amended order February 5, 1991.
On May 22, 1991, Homeowners Association filed a "Motion to
Pay $98,500.00 into an Interest-Bearing Account Under Control of
the Court,11 which motion was granted. The court denied the
association7s other motion to enter an order requiring that the
$98,500.00 be returned to it in the event the appellate court
reversed the trial court's quiet title order in its favor.
Because it did not wane to risk the money, Homeowners Association
refused to pay the $98,500.00.
On August 20, 1991, after being notified by Foothills Water
Company that the $98,500.00 had not been paid to it as provided,
the court entered a quiet title order in favor of Foothills Water
Company.
Homeowners Association appeals, seeking reversal of the
quiet title order in favor of"Foothills Water Company, and
reversal of the determination that it was required to pay
$98,500.00 as a condition precedent to receiving quiet title. It
also seeks an order requiring the trial court to quiet title in
its favor without the encumbrance (the well lease) referred to in
its final order.

2. District courts are courts of record. Utah Const, art. VIII,
§ 1. We are perplexed at the court's refusal to make a record of
this motion and decision. See Briacs v. Holcomb. 740 P.2d 281,
282-82 (Utah App. 1987).
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Bagley also appeals, claiming the trial court should have
apportioned part of the reimbursement damages to him because he
expended money for capital improvements to the water system,
along with costs of operation and maintenance. He also claims
entitlement to a security interest in the water system.
The initial issues are: (1) whether the trial court abused
its discretion in disallowing an evidentiary hearing on the issue
of ownership; (2) whether the court erred in initially quieting
title in favor of Homeowners Association; including (3) whether
the court was empowered to maJce its order contingent on the
association paying $98,500.00 to Foothills Water Company; (4)
whether the court correctly determined that Bagley was not
entitled to damages; and (5) whether the court correctly
determined that Foothills Water Company had not presented a prima
-facie case to establish slander of title.
The remaining issues involve zhe jurisdiction of the PSC vis
a vis the jurisdiction of the district court. We review those
issues after we disoose of the initial issues.
PROCEDURE
The posture of this case, at least regarding the issue of
ownership, is similar to that of a summary judgment because the.,
court had no evidence before it other than the parties7
stipulated statement of facts. While the court also had before
it Foothills Water Company's proffers, the court never considered
them because Foothills Water Company failed to timely request a
hearing on the disputed issues. The court had ordered, pursuant
to the parties' agreement, that the parties attempt to submit the
matter via stipulation and proffer. *The parties agreed to submit
a statement of stipulated facts and contentions, to proffer
disputed issues, and to request an evidentiary hearing, if any of
them felt one was warranted. They agreed to submit their
stipulation and to argue their positions on a date certain, which
date was postponed several times. The parties finally argued the
matter on October 25, 1988.
While the court na^er set a deadline for requesting an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of ownership, logic dictates
that the deadline could be no later than argument and submission
of the issue. In other words, the fact that none of the parties
requested an evidentiary hearing prior to October 25, 1988, the
date of oral argument, suggests that, as of that date, they saw
no nead for such a hearing and thus waived it.
Thus, when Foothills Water Company moved the court to
reconsider its refusal to grant an evidentiary hearing, the court
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did not err in denying the motion because the parties, by their
inaction, had waived their right to a hearing.
QUIZT TITLE TO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
Foothills Water Company claims the trial court erred in its
October 25, 1989 order granting quiet title in favor of
Homeowners Association. It also claims the court erred in
issuing a ruling entirely independent of its proffers*
The parties stipulated that, prior to 1985, title to the
water rignr and to the water tank lots "could still be considered
to be in the name of Zicns Bank or Hi-Country Estates, Inc."
Given this stipulation, and given that quit-claim deeds were
executed in favor of Homeowners Association by the principals of
Hi-Country Estates, Inc. en behalf of those entities, and by
trust officers of the bank, the court did not err in concluding
that Homeowners Association held legal title to the water right,
lots, and system.
CONTINGENT QUIET TITLE ORDER
Homeowners Association claims the trial court erred in
conditioning its quiet title upon its paying $98,500.00 to
Foothills Water Company* It also claims the court erred in
issuing a quiet title_in favor of Foothills Water Company upon
the association7s failure to pay the amount set.
Utah's quiet title statute requires a court to allow as a
setoff or counterclaim the value of the improvements provided by
one, who in good faith, is "holding under color of title
adversely to the claims of the [owner]." Utah Code Ann. § 78-405 (1992). It does not provide for a contingent quiet title.
Moreover, a contingent quiet title is antithetical to the nature
of the action because a court issues a quiet title by virtue of
the claimant's strength of title rather than by reason of the
weakness of the opponent's title. Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch
Cor?., 659 ?.2d 1045, 1048-49 (Utah 1983).
Here, the court first quieted title in Homeowners
Association and then took title away from it by making the
association's quiet title contingent on its paying a set amount
to Foothills Water Company. We find no legal justification or
authority for the court setting such a contingency on Homeowners
Association's quiet title. Further, the court did not allow
Foothills Water Company a mere setoff or counterclaim for the
value of its good faith improvements. Thus, the court erred in
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quieting title in Foothills Water Company's favor as a default
position for the association's refusal to pay the amount set.
We therefore reverse the contingent quiet title order and
remand for the court to issue a quiet title order in favor of
Homeowners Association. We next address whether the quiet title
may be subject to a setoff or counterclaim as a result of
Bagley's claim. Later in this opinion, we address the general
issue of Foothills Water Company's award as we discuss the role
of the Public Service Commission.
BAGLEY'S DAMAGES
Bagley cross appeals, claiming the trial court erred in
ordering reimbursement to Foothills Water Company, but not to
him. Bagley claims no evidence supported excluding him from the
reimbursement award.
The parties stipulated that on October 31, 1985, Bagley,
pursuant to an assignment, transferred to Dansie all of his stock
in Foothills Water Company. The stipulation, which incorporated
Bagley's assignment, noted that Bagley transferred "all right,
title and interest in any and all water rights, equipment,
easements, rights of way or property they have or may have in or
to or associated with the water system . . . ff
"An assignment merely sets over or transfers the interest of
one party in certain property to another." Tanner v. Lawler, 6
Utah 2d 84, 205 P.2d 882", 835 (1957). Accord Wisccmoe v.
Lockhart Co.. 608 P.2d 236, 233 (Utah 1980) ("an assignee takes
nothing more by his assignment than his assignor had11)".
Given the parties/ stipulation regarding the terms of the
assignment, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that "all [of
Bagley's] claims, rights, title and interest in said water system
and water right merged with those of defendant J. Rodney Dansie
and defendant Foothills Water Company." Thus, because Bagley had
no rights in the system after October 31, 1985, he is not
entitled to compensation for amounts paid by him prior to his
transfer.
SLANDER OF TITLE
Foothills Water Company, in its cross-appeal, claims the
trial court erred in dismissing its claims for slander of title
because it had proffered to the court that Homeowners
Association's agents, Turner and Sims, sought and obtained deeds
to the "water tank lots" and an assignment of the water right,
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and attempted to use the documents to illegally obtain control
and ownership of the system.
An action for slander of title "consists of the willful
recordation or publication of untrue material that is disparaging
to another's title." Jack B. Parson Cos, v. Nield, 751 P.2d
1131, 1134 (Utah 1988). Accord First Sec. Bank v. Banberrv
Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Utah 1989); Bass v. Planned
Management Servs. . Inc., 761 P.2d 566, 563 (Utah 1988).
Heref the trial court, on October 20, 1989, concluded that
the "counterclaim by Foothills Water Company is hereby dismissed
for lack of proof.11 Given that the court had granted Homeowners
Association title, it implicitly ruled that the association acted
under color of title, and therefore acted without malice. That
is, by determining that Homeowners Association had title, which
determination we affirm, the court could not have also ruled that
the association had committed an act that was "disparaging to
another's title." Jack 3, Parson, 751 P.2d at 1134 (emphasis
added). Thus the trial court correctly dismissed the claim.
REMAINING ISSUES
The remaining issues involve the jurisdiction of the Public
Service Commission vis a vis the jurisdiction of the district
court- These issues include (1) whether the court erred in
refusing to grant summary judgment on the issue of Foothills
Water Company's compensation; (2) whether the court erred in
determining the well lease was valid and binding on the owner of
the water system; and (3) whether the court erred in requiring
Homeowners Association to allow Foothills Water Company to
transport water through its system to customers outside the
subdivision.
Homeowners Association claims the court erred in refusing to
summarily rule on these issues. In the alternative, the
association argues that this court should remand these issues to
the PSC for determination.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION JURISDICTION
The parties dispute whether the PSC and not the district
court should properly determine the value of the system payable
by Homeowners Association and the value of improvements made
between 1974 and 1985. Because the issue of the jurisdiction of
the PSC vis a vis the jurisdiction of the district court is
crucial to several issues in this case, we discuss it at length.

920450-CA

12

In an order dared March 17, 1986, the PSC determined that
Foothills Water Ccmcany had been operating an uncertified public
utility.4
The PSC is empowered to "ascertain tiie value of the property
of every public utility in this state and every fact which in
its judgment: may or does have any bearing on such value." Utah
Code Ann. § 54-4-21 (1990). Moreover, tiie PSC's valuation of a
public utility "shall be considered the actual value of the
properties of"said public utilities in Utah, unless otherwise
changed after hearings by order of the commission." Id.
Likewise, the PSC may hold hearings to determine the value of
public utiiitv orcterties and imorovements. Utah Code Ann. § 547-19(1) (a) and ~(2) "(a).
The essential objectives of the PSC's supervision are
twofold: (1) to assure a public utility's "continued ability to
be able to serve the customers who rely upon [it] for essential
services and products"; and (2) to balance "the interest of
having financially sound utilities that provide essential goods
and services against the public interest of having goods and
services made available without discrimination and on the .basis
of reasonable costs." Garkane Power Ass'n v. Public Serv.
Comn'n, 631 P.2d 1196r 1207 (Utah 1984) (per curiam).
The PSC is empowered to set utility rates following
hearings. Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-4(1) and 54-7-12(1) and (2);
4. Utah Cede Ann. § 54-2-1 (Supp. 1993) provides that public
utilities include water systems and water corporations. The term
"water corporation" includes
every corporation and person, their lessees,
trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling,
operatingf or managing any water system for
public service within this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 (34) . The term "water system" includes
ail reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, diJces
headgates, pipes, flumes, canals, structures,
and appliances, and ail other real estate,
fixtures, and personal property owned,
controlled, operated, or managed in
connection with or to facilitate the
diversion, development, storage, supply,
distribution, sale, furnishing, carriage,
appointment, apportionment, or measurement of
water for power, fire protection, irrigation,
reclamation, or manufacturing, or for
municipal, domestic, or other beneficial use.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(35).
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Department of 5us. 5eg. v. Public Serv. Coina'n. 720 P.2d 420, 420
(Utah 1986) . "In determining an appropriate rate, the PSC
considers the utility's historical income and cost data, as well
as predictions of future costs and revenues, and arrives at a
rate which is projected as being adequate to cover costs and give
the utility's shareholders a fair return on equity." Id.
Utah courts have long held that the PSC may regulate public
utility rates, even when doing so requires altering contractual
relationships. Utah Hcral Co, v. Public Utilities CoTnm'n, 204 P.
511, 515 (1922); Utah Copper Co. v. Public Utilities Comn'n, 203
•P. 627, 621 (Utah 1921) . The public interest in access to
utilities, and in fair and just rates, justifies such regulation
and justifies the altering of contractual relationships.
Arkansas Natural Gas Co, v. Arkansas R-R. Common. 261 U.S. 379,
383, 43 S. Ct. 287, 283 (1923). "It is the intervention of the
public interest which justifies and, at the same time conditions
[the PSC's] exercise.* Id.5
Thus, to determine whether the district court or the PSC
should properly determine the value of capital improvements
during the relevant period, we analyze whether such a
determination invoices the public interest and serves the
objectives of the PSC. See id.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Homeowners Association claims the trial court erred by not
granting summary judgment on the issue of the amount owed to
Foothills Water Company. The association claims summary judgment
was appropriate because (1) the PSC is uniquely qualified and has
jurisdiction to value the sysram in this instance where the
dispute involves the ratepayers; (2) the PSC has already
determined that the association paid for the value of the utility
at the time the individual members purchased their lots; and (3)
the PSC has already determined the degree to which the value of
improvements made between 1974 and 1985 could be included in the
rate base.
Here, the trial court, using a theory of unjust enrichment,
found that Homeowners Association should reimburse Foothills
5. We acJcnowledge that "not every contract entered into by a
public utility is subject to the jurisdiction of the PSC."
Garfcane Power. 631 P.2d at 1207. For example, "contracts dealing
with the ordinciry conduct of a business, are contracts that could
be liticated only in a district court and not before the PSC."

Id.
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Water Company $98,500.00 for the value of the "entire water
system, the improvements made thereon from 1974 to 1985 and the
water right." "in other words, the trial court not only evaluated
improvements, but it evaluated the entire system and imposed
payment for the whole system.
Here, the valuation of the system and its capital
improvements invokes the public interest of the ratepayers (in
this case, the individual ratepayers who comprise the
association) and their access to utilities and fair and just
rates. See Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Arkansas R.R. Conm'n. 261
U.S. 379, 383, 43 S. Ct. 387, 388 (1923). Moreover, this case is
not confined merely to "the ordinary conduct of a business . . .
that could be litigated only in a district court and not before
the PSC." Garkane Power Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 631 P.2d
1196, 1207 (Utah 1984) (per curiam). In short, the public
interest of the ratepayers and their fair access to utilities
justifies the exercise of the PSC's jurisdiction. See Arkansas
Natural Gas. 261 U.S. at 383, 43 S. Ct. at 388.
The PSC determined that "the improvements made between 1977
and 1980 were to have been provided by Bagley as part of the
original system." In Re Foothills Water. Case No. 85-2010-01
(Utah PSC 1986). The PSC concluded that only $16,334.99 was
allowable as legitimate costs of improvements to the system that
were not recovered in the sale of lots originally.
"In all collateral actions or proceedings the orders and
decisions of the commission which have become final shall be
conclusive." Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-14 (1990); accord North Salt
Lake v. St. Joseph Water i Irrigation Co.. 222 P.2d 577, 585
(Utah 1950).
We therefore hold that the PSC determination regarding the
amount Foothills Water Company could recover for its improvements
is binding. Accordingly, we agree with the PSC that the
$16,334.99 is includable in the rate base.
WELL LEASE ENCUMBRANCE
Homeowners Association claims the trial court erred in
determining that the well lease entered into between Bagley and
Dansie was a valid and binding encumbrance. The association
claims the court had no jurisdiction to determine the validity of
an encumbrance on a public utility. In a similar vein,
Homeowners Association claims the court erred in failing to hold
that the PSC's determination precludes Foothills Water Company
from asserting the validity of the well lease agreement. In the
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alternative, the association claims the lease did not constitute
an encumbrance because it had lapsed.
The PSC is empowered to "ascertain the value of the property
of ever/ public utility in this state and every fact which in its
judgment may or does have any bearing on such value." Utah Code
Ann. § 54-4-21 (1990). Moreover the PSC#s valuation of a public
utility "shall be considered the actual value of the properties
of said public utilities in Utah unless otherwise changed after
hearings by order of the commission." Id.
"Any transfer of a utility asset should be for fair market
value so an appropriate benefit therefrom will redound to the
credit of the ratepayers." Committee of Consumer Servs. v.
Public Serv. Coim'Ti/595 P.2d 871, 378 (Utah 1979), cert, denied,
sub ncm. Mountain Fuel Suoolv Co. v. Committee of Consumer
Servs.. 444 U.S. 1014, 100 S. Ct. 664-65 (1980). The PSC must
approve any such transfer based upon a determination as to
"whether the transaction is detrimental to the ratepayer, and
whether it is in the public interest." Id.
The issue of whether the well lease is a valid encumbrance
on the property is one which has "bearing on such value [of a
public utility]." Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-21. The issue is also
one of fact regarding whether the Dansie family has been granted
"any preference or advantage" and whether Homeowners Association
has been subjected to "any prejudice or disadvantage." Utah Code
Ann. § 54-3-8. In short, this issue is within the PSC's
exclusive jurisdiction. Moreover, it is one the PSC has already
determined.
The PSC determined, in an order dated March 17, 198 6, that
the well lease agreement was "grossly unreasonable" and that it
had the effecc of "showering virtually limitless benefits on
Jesse Oansie and the members of his immediate family." The PSC
found the agreement "makes Bagley personally responsible to
fulfill the terms and conditions of the lease, whether or not a
water company is created to which Bagley conveys or assigns the
Weil Lease Agreement." The PSC found it "unjust and unreasonable
to expect Foothills7 53 active customers to support the entire
burden of the Well Lease Agreement." Based on these findings,
the PSC ordered Foothills Water Company to "obtain approval from
this Commission before entering into any future lease or sales
agreements for the provision of water to Foothills's service area
or any amendment to or assignment of any lease or sales agreement
that is now in force or effect." The PSC then held that its
statutory duty prevented it from imposing the terms of the lease
upon Homeowners Association and other present and future
customers.
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The PSC's 1936 order allowed Foothills Water Company to
continue to supply water to the Dansie family conditioned upon
payment of the"cost of delivery by someone other than the
customers in Foothills Water Company's service area. The order
also required that Foothills Water Company bring any subsequent
lease to the Commission for approval.6
Despite these orders of the PSC, the district court found
that the*1977 well lease between Bagley and Dansie was a valid^
and binding encumbrance on the water system, and thus the Dansie
family was"entitled to draw, without charge, water from the
system's Dansie well, "in the amount of either twelve million
gallons per year or such larger amount as the excess capacity of
the system shall permit, as long as the system exists and is
operative." The court found that such encumbrance "does not in
any way legally burden the water system or the owner or operator
of the water system."
Given the PSC's jurisdiction to determine whether a public
utility may be so encumbered, and given the PSC's March 17, 1986
order requiring Foothills Water Company to obtain PSC approval to
obtain any extension of the well lease agreement, we reverse the
district court's order insofar as it pertains to the validity of
the well lease agreement.
TRANSPORTATION OF WATER TO OUTSIDERS
Homeowners Association claims the trial court erred in
issuing an order requiring it to allow Foothills Water Company to
transport water through its system to customers outside the
subdivision.
The district court issued an interlocutory order permitting
Foothills Water Company to transfer water through the system to
its customers within its service area but outside the
subdivision, so long as these customers pay a fair use fee. This
order was based on a single finding: "Foothills Water Company
and its predecessors have used the system throughout its
existence to serve customers outside"the Hi-Country Estates Phase
6. Foothills Water Company has never sought Commission approval
of the terms of the well lease. More recently, on November 30,
1992, the PSC determined that all costs of the well lease
agreement, which exceed the costs of the alternative source, are
unreasonable and must be carried by Foothills Water Company if it
decides to continue the lease. The record shows that even though
the lease provided that the parties could extend it, they did not
"do so.
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I Subdivision." Apparently the court based this "finding" on the
parties7 stipulation that "Foothills is, and has been since 1985,
rhe current certificated utility serving the Subdivision (and
certain other surrounding properties)."
First, this stipulated fact does not necessarily support the
legal conclusion that Foothills Water Company may transport water
outside the subdivision. More importantly, the issue involves
the essential objectives of the PSC's supervision. Those
objectives are: (1) to assure a public utility's "continued
ability to be able to serve the customers who rely upon them for
•essential services and products;" and (2) to balance "the
interest of having financially sound utilities that provide
essential goods and services against the public interest of
having goods and services made available without discrimination
and on the basis of reasonable costs." Garkane Power Ass'n v.
Public Serv. Comn'Ti. 531 P.2d 1196, 1207 (Utah 1984) (per
curiam) . See also Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Arkansas R.R.
Comm'n, 261 U.S. 279, 382, 43 S. Ct. 387, 388 (1923); North Salt
Lake v. St. Joseph Warar & Irrigation Co. , 118 Utah 600, 223 P.2d
577, 582 (Utah 1950) (the PSC is empowered to determine relative
rights and obligations between utility and consumer).
Thus, the issue of whether or not a utility is entitled tor
provide water to a group of customers falls within the
jurisdiction of the-PSC.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion ve (l) affirm the district court's initial
conclusion that Hcmecwners Association holds legal title to the
water right, lots and system; (2) remand for the court to issue a
quiet title order in Homeowners Association's favor with no
contingencies; (2) affirm the court's conclusion that Bagley is
not entitled to any damages; (4) affirm the court's conclusion
that Foothills Water Company's claim for slander of title be
dismissed; (5) reverse zhe court's order denying summary judgment
on the issue of compensation, actaiowledging the PSC's order that
the amount of $15,224.99 is includable in the rate base; (6)
reverse the district court's order regarding the validity of the

920450-CA

18

well lease agreement; and (7) reverse the court's order regarding
distributees of water to outsiders, acknowledging the PSC's
over that i^Fe-

WE CONCUR:

7~ <.
amela T. Greenwood,* Judge
Gregory*". Orae, Judge
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
RUSSON. Justice:
We granted certiorari for the narrow purpose of
reviewing the court of appeals' decision concerning the
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission (the PSC) as it
relates to issues in this case. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
Because the issues involved on certiorari relate solely
to the PSC's jurisdiction, we recite only the facts that sure
pertinent to that issue. A full discussion of the facts
concerning other issues raised before the court of appeals in
this matter can be found in Hi-Countrv Estates Homeowners Ass'n
v. Baalev S Co.. 863 P.2d 1, 2-7 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert.
granted. 879 P.2d 266 (Utah 1994).
This case involves a controversy between Foothills
Water Company (the Water Company) and the Hi-Country Estates
Homeowners Association (the Homeowners Association) concerning
the ownership of a water system, two lots upon which the system7s
water tanks are located, and a well water ricrht related to the
water system.
In March 1985, the Homeowners Association, which is
comprised of the owners of lots in the Hi-Country Estates
subdivision, brought this action in district court, seeking to
quiet title to the subdivision7s water system, the two lots upon
which the system's water tanks are located, and the related well
water right, in the name of the Homeowners Association. The
Water Company responded by filing a counterclaim, seeking to
quiet title to the water system, the water lots, and the water
right in its name.1 Gerald H. Bagley, a former owner and
operator of the water system, also counterclaimed, arguing that
if the court determined that the Homeowners Association owned the
water system, it should be required to reimburse him for the cost
of improvements he made to the water system, as well as for all
expenses related to the operation and maintenance of the water
system.2
1

The Water Company additionally sought damages for slander
of title from the Homeowners Association and several individuals
who are not parties to this appeal. However, this claim was
dismissed by the district court for "lack of proof" and is not
before this court on certiorari.
2

Although Bagley originally brought the counterclaim for
reimbursement, the district court determined that the Water
Company was the party properly entitled to reimbursement because
Bagley had assigned all his rights to the Water Company.
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While this matter was pending before the district
court, a dispute arose between the Water Company and the
Homeowners Association concerning increases in the rates charged
by the Water Company. At a rate-setting hearing before the PSC
in January 1986, the Homeowners Association argued that the Water
Company should not be allowed to include the cost of the water
system as a capital investment in its rate base. The PSC ruled
that, pending resolution of the ownership dispute in district
court, only a small portion of the Water Company's capital
investment could be properly included in its rate base. On
March 17, 1986, the PSC issued its final report and order,
finding that only $16,334.99 of the improvements to the water
system could be included in the rate base as legitimate costs
thereof.
Trial on the quiet title action began in district court
on August 25, 1988. At that time, the parties agreed to
stipulate to certain facts, proffer evidence on the remaining
facts, brief all issues, and submit them to the court for
decision. On October 14, 1988, the parties filed a stipulated
statement of undisputed facts and -disputed contentions.
Following a hearing on October 25, 1988, the district
court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
judgment declaring that the Homeowners Association "is the legal
owner of the disputed water system, which includes the water
rights, the water lots, the water tanks, and the water lines."
However, the court conditioned its ruling upon payment by the
Homeowners Association to the Water Company of an amount to be
determined at a later evidentiary hearing for improvements made
to the water "system.
The Homeowners Association subsequently moved for
summary judgment on the issue of the amount of reimbursement it
owed to the Water Company. The association asserted that the
district court was bound by the PSC's determination that only
$16,334.99 of the improvements to the water system could be
included in the rate base. The court denied the motion.
An evidentiary hearing was held in late July and early
August 1990 to determine the amount of reimbursement owed by the
Homeowners Association to the Water Company. Applying a theory
of unjust enrichment, the district court determined that the
Homeowners Association owed the Water Company $98,500 for the
"entire water system, the improvements made thereon from 1974 to
1985, and the water right." In an order dated October 31, 1990,
the court directed the association to pay the sum of $98,500 to
the Water Company no later than August 15, 1991. The court
additionally ruled that a 1977 well lease agreement between
Bagley, who owned and operated the water system at that time, and
Jessie J. Dansie, the owner of the well in question, in which
Dansie agreed to supply water from the Dansie well to the water
system, was a valid and binding encumbrance on the water system
3
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and required the association to permit the Dansies to receive and
transport water through the subject water system free of charge
as long as the system is operative.
At a subsequent informal conference between the
district judge and counsel for the parties, the Water Company and
Bagley orally moved that the district court clarify its
October 31, 1990, order to provide that if the Homeowners
Association failed to pay the Water Company by August 15, 1991,
the court would enter a judgment quieting title to the water
system in the Water Company. The district court granted this
motion and entered an order clarifying its prior order on
February 5, 1991.
On August 20, 1991, after being notified by the Water
Company that the Homeowners Association had not paid the
reimbursement sum of $98,500 as required by the court's
February 5 order, the district court entered a judgment quieting
title in the Water Company.
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, the Homeowners
Association asked the court to (1) reverse the district court's
judgment quieting title in the Water Company and quiet title in
its favor, (2) reverse the district court's denial of its motion
for summary judgment on the issue of the amount it owed to the
Water Company for improvements to the water system for the years
1974 to 1985, and (3) reverse the district court's conclusion
that it was required to reimburse the Water Company as a
condition precedent to quieting title.
The court of appeals (1) reversed the district court's
judgment quieting title in the Water Company, holding that legal
title was rightfully in the Homeowners Association; (2) reversed
the district court's denial of summary judgment on the issue of
the compensation owed to the Water Company, deferring to the
PSC's determination that only $16,334.99 of the improvements to
the water1 system were includable in the rate base, and
(3) reversed the district court's judgment addressing the
validity of the 1977 well lease agreement on the ground that the
PSC had previously invalidated that agreement.3

3

In the same opinion, the court of appeals also reversed an
interlocutory order of the district court which permitted the
Water Company to transfer water through the system to customers
within its service area but outside of the subdivision, provided
that these customers pay a fair use fee. Hi-Countrv Estates
Homeowners Ass'n v. Baalev i Co., 863 P.2d 1, 12 (Utah Ct. App.
1993), cert, granted, 879 P.2d 266 (Utah 1994). However,
subsequent to the issuance of that opinion, the Water Company has
been decertified as a public utility by the PSC. Accordingly,
its rights to transfer water are now moot.
No. 940046
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The Water Company filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari with this court. We granted the said writ only for
the narrow purpose of reviewing the court of appeals7 decision
concerning the PSC's jurisdiction as it relates to the issues in
this case*
On certiorari, the Water Company raises the following
two arguments in response to the court of appeals' opinion:
First, it asserts that the PSC did not determine the fair market
value of the property in question for all purposes, including
unjust enrichment, nor did it have the power to do so; and
second, it claims that the PSC did not invalidate the 1977 well
lease agreement and did not have the power to do so- The
Homeowners Association responds that (1) the PSC has the power to
determine the fair market value of property for all purposes and
therefore the court of appeals correctly ruled that the district
court was bound by the PSC's determination that only $16,334.99
of the improvements to the water system were includable in the
rate base, and (2) the PSC has the power to invalidate the 1977
well lease agreement and did invalidate that agreement.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In its motion for summary judgment on the issue of the
amount of reimbursement owed to the Water Company, the Homeowners
Association asserted that the district court could award the
Water Company only $16,334.99," the amount that the PSC determined
could be included in the rate base as legitimate costs of
improvements to the system. Specifically, the association argued
that the PSC had the power to determine the fair market value of
the water system for all purposes and therefore the district
court was bound by the PSC's determination. The district court
denied the motion and, using a theory of unjust enrichment,
determined
that the association owed the Water Company $98,500
for the nentire water system, the improvements made thereon from
1974 to 1985, and the water right." The court of appeals
reversed, holding that the PSC's rate base determination
compelled the district court to limit its reimbursement award to
$16,334.99.
The PSC has only the rights and powers granted to it by
statute. Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah
1988). Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 states in pertinent part:
The commission is hereby vested with
power and jurisdiction to supervise and
regulate every public utility in this state,
and to supervise all of the business of every
such public utility in this state, and to do
all things, whether herein specifically
designated or in addition thereto, which are
necessary or convenient in the exercise of
such power and jurisdiction[.]
5
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In keeping with this general grant of power, Utah Code
Ann. S 54-4-21 specifically, provides:
The commission shall have power to
ascertain the value of the property of every
public utility in this state and every fact
which in its judgment may or does have any
bearing on such value. The commission shall
have power to make revaluations from time to
time and to ascertain the value of new
construction, extensions, and additions to
the property of every public utility;
provided, that the valuation of the property
of all public utilities doing business within
the state located in Utah as recorded in
accordance with Section 54-4-22 of this
chapter shall be considered the actual value
of the properties of said public utilities in
Utah unless otherwise changed after hearings
by order of the commission. In case the
commission changes the valuation of the
properties of any public utility said new
valuations found by the commission shall be
the valuations of said public utility for all
purposes provided in this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. 5 54-4-21 (emphasis added); see also Utah Code
Ann. S 54-4-4 (granting PSC broad discretion in establishing
rates for public utilities).
"It is well established that the Commission has no
inherent regulatory powers other than those expressly granted OJ
clearly implied by statute." Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 928, 930 (Utah 1988) (citing Basin
Flying Serv. v. ny
Public Serv. Comm'n. 531 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah
1975)). When a specific power is conferred by statute upon a
tribunal, board, or commission with limited powers, the powers
are limited -to such as are specifically mentioned.'" Union Pac.
R.R. v. Public Serv, Comm'n, 103 Utah 186, 197, 134 P.2d 469, 474
(1943) (quoting Bamberger Elec. R.R. v. Public Utils- CoTmn'nr 59
Utah 351, 364, 204 P. 314, 320 (1922)); accord Williams, 754 P.2d
at 50. "All powers retained by the PSC are derived from and
created by statute. The PSC has no inherent regulatory powers
and can only assert those which are expressly granted or clearly
implied as necessary to the discharge of the duties and
responsibilities imposed upon it." Williams, 754 P.2d at 50
(citing Basin Flying Serv.. 531 P.2d at 1305). Accordingly,
w
[t]o ensure that the administrative powers of the PSC are not
overextended, *any reasonable doubt of the existence of any power
must be resolved against the exercise thereof.'" Id. (quoting
Public Serv. Comm'n v. Formal Complaint of WWZ Co.. 641 P.2d 183,
186 (Wyo. 1982)).
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Despite its broad language, section 54-4-1 does not
confer upon the Commission a limitless right to act as it sees
fit, and this court has never interpreted it as doing so.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 754 P.2d at 930. "Explicit or
clearly implied statutory authority for any regulatory action
must exist." Id. (citing Utah Deo't of Business Regulation v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1986); ReamsTribune Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 682 P.2d 858, 859 (Utah
1984)). Accordingly, the sections cited above clearly do not
give the PSC absolute power to determine fair market value for
all purposes, but merely for the purposes outlined in that
chapter, that is, the purposes necessary to regulate and
supervise public utilities. In fact, were we to hold otherwise
and determine that the PSC can valuate property for all purposes,
as the Homeowners Association would have us do, we would render
the Utah Code internally inconsistent since the tax commission
has the power to assess public utilities for the purposes of
taxation. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-204.
The district court's valuation of the property and
water right in question did not involve the fair market value of
the water system for rate-making purposes but, rather, involved
the actual fair market value of the property for the purpose of
determining the amount of unjust enrichment. Accordingly, the
court of appeals erred in holding that the PSC has the authority
to determine the fair market value of the property for all
purposes and declaring deference to the PSC as to the value of
the property in question for purposes of determining the amount
of unjust enrichment.
Moreover, even if the PSC had the power and authority
to determine fair market value of the water system for all
purposes, it did not do so in the present case. It is clear from
the PSC's March 17, 1986, order that it was determining the value
of the water system only for the purposes of rate-making. In
fact, the first sentence of that order states, "Pursuant to
notice duly served, this matter came on for general rate hearing
on January 22, 23, 24, [27,] and 28, 1986, before Kent Walgren, n
Administrative Law Judge for the Utah Public Service Commission.
(Emphasis added.) Furthermore, the PSC did not find that
$16,334.99 was the fair market value of the improvements to the
system, but simply found that that figure represented fl[the Water
Company's] total allowable rate base." Finally, the findings of
fact and conclusions of law supporting the PSC's order
exclusively address the PSC's determination of the fair rate that
the Water Company may charge its customers. Since (1) any order
of the PSC must be narrowly construed as passing only upon the
issues before it, White River Shale Oil Corp. v. Public Serv.
Commln, 700 P.2d 1088, 1093 (Utah 1985), and (2) the PSC's
March 17, 1986, order addressed the value of the water system
solely for rate-making purposes, it was error for the court of
appeals to order the district court to defer to this figure for
purposes of unjust enrichment. Accordingly, the court of appeals
7
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erred in reversing the district courts denial of the Homeowners
Association's motion for summary judgment on the issue of the
amount of reimbursement owed to the Water Company and in ordering
the district court to defer to the PSC.
WELL LEASE AGREEMENT
In 1977, Bagley, the owner and operator of the subject
water system at that time, and Dansie, the owner of the well in
question, entered into a well lease agreement under the terms of
which water from the Dansie well was supplied to the Hi-Country
Estates subdivision water system. The lease stated that it had a
ten-year term but could be renewed on April 10, 1987, "on terms
to be agreed to by Bagley and Dansie." Subsequently, in 1980,
Bagley transferred his interest in the water system to Jordan
Acres, a limited partnership of which Bagley was a general
partner. On June 7, 1985, this interest was transferred from
Jordan Acres to the Water Company. In its March 17, 1986, order,
the PSC found that the well lease agreement was "grossly
unreasonable" and refused to impose its terms upon the Homeowners
Association. The district court, on the other hand, ruled that
the 1977 well lease agreement was a valid and binding encumbrance
on the subdivision's water system. On appeal to the court of
appeals, the Homeowners Association argued that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to determine the validity of an
encumbrance on a public utility and that the PSC's determination
precluded the Water Company from asserting the validity of the
well lease agreement. The court of appeals agreed and reversed
the district court's order.
On certiorari, the Water Company argues alternatively
that (1) the PSC's March 17, 1986, order did not invalidate the
1977 agreement, and (2) even if the PSC's order did purport to
invalidate that agreement, the PSC did not have jurisdiction to
do so. The Homeowners Association responds that the PSC's order
did invalidate the 1977 agreement between Dansie and Bagley and
therefore the court of appeals was correct in reversing the
district court's order directing the association to provide the
Dansies water as long as the system is operative.
The PSC's March 17, 1986, order specifically found:
11. On April 7, 1977, Jesse Dansie, as
lessor, and Bagley as lessee, entered into a
"Well Lease and Water Line Extension
Agreement" (hereafter "Well Lease Agreement")
for Well No. 1 . . . . Under this ten-year
lease (which expires in April 1987), in
return for the use of the well and water
therefrom, Bagley agrees to the following:
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a. To pay $5,100 plus $300 per
month for the first five years and $600
per month for the next five years.

12. In 1980, the Subdivision water
company was transferred from Bagley to
another limited partnership, Jordan Acres
("Jordan Acres"), of which Bagley was a
general partner. On June 7, 1985, • • • the
water company assets were transferred from
Jordan Acres to [the Water Company], in
return for all of [the Water Company's]
outstanding shares.
On the basis of these and other findings, the PSC
concluded:
The Commission finds that it is unreasonable
to expect [the Water Company] to support the
entire burden of the Well Lease Agreement.
This Agreement, insofar as it relates
strictly to benefits received by [the Water
Company] . . . is grossly unreasonable,
requiring not only substantial monthly
payments, but also showering virtually
limitless benefits on Jessie Dansie and the
members of his immediate family. . • •

. . . While no one can blame Mr. Dansie
for desiring to provide free water to his
children in virtual perpetuity, this
Commission would be abrogating its statutory
duty were it to impose such a burden on [the
Water Company's] present and future
customers•

. . . We find that it would be unjust
and unreasonable to expect [the Water
Company's] 63 active customers [i.e., the
Homeowners Association] to support the entire
burden of the Well Lease Agreement. . . .

. . . The Commission has no objection to
the Dansies continuing to obtain their water
from Well No. 1, provided the actual pro-rata
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(not incremental) costs for power,
chlorination and water testing involved in
delivering that water are paid for by someone
other than customers in [the Water Company's]
service area [i.e., the members of the
Homeowners Association].
Under the plain language of the PSC's order, the effect
of that order was to prohibit the 1977 well lease agreement from
affecting the rates paid by the Homeowners Association, not to
invalidate the agreement altogether. In other words, the PSC's
order did not purport to invalidate the 1977 agreement, it merely
limited the amount that the Homeowners Association would pay for
it, a matter clearly within the PSC's rate-making authority.
Thus, the court of appeals incorrectly held that the PSC's order
invalidated the 1977 well lease agreement.
In any event, the PSC did not have jurisdiction to
invalidate the 1977 well lease agreement as long as that
agreement did not impact the rates paid by the Homeowners
Association. Although the PSC has power to construe contracts
affecting matters within its jurisdiction such as rate-making,
ordinary contracts unrelated to such matters are outside of the
purview of PSC jurisdiction. See Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 682 P.2d 858, 860 (Utah 1984) (f,Any activities of a
utility that actually affect its rate structure would necessarily
be subject to some degree to the PSC's broad supervisory powers
in relation to rates. The question, then, is whether the
activity the Commission is attempting to regulate is closely
connected to its supervision of the utility's rates and whether
the manner of the regulation is reasonably related to the
legitimate legislative purpose of rate control for the protection
of the consumer.M); see also Garkane Power Ass'n v. Public Serv.
Comm'n. 681 P.2d 1196, 1207 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) (holding
that not every contract entered into by a public utility is
subject to the jurisdiction of the PSC; contracts such as those
concerning the ordinary conduct of a business can be litigated
only in district court and not before the PSC). See generally
Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988)
(stating that ,f%any reasonable doubt of the existence of any
power [of the PSC] must be resolved against the exercise
thereof" (quoting Public Serv. Comm'n v. Formal Complaint of WWZ
Co.. 641 P-2d 183, 186 (Wyo. 1982))).
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the court of appeals'
reversal of the district court's denial of the Hi-Country Estates
Homeowners Association's motion for summary judgment on the issue
of the amount of reimbursement owed to Foothills Water Company is
reversed. The court of appeals' determination that the PSC's
order invalidated the 1977 well lease agreement between Bagley
and Dansie is also reversed, and this matter is remanded to the
No. 940046
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court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

WE CONCUR:

Michael 0. Zimmerman, Chief
Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Associate
Chief Justice

Richard C- Howe, Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice
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ADDENDUM 5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE HOMEOWNERS
SHOULD PAY FOOTHILLS S98,500.00 TO OBTAIN A QUIET TITLE
ORDER TO THE WATER SYSTEM AND WATER RIGHT,
The trial judge issued its "Order on Ownership Issues" on
October 20, 1989, and ruled that H(P)laintiff is the legal owner of
the disputed water system, which includes the water rights, the
water lots, the water tanks, and the water lines." (Add. 1 ) . The
Court went on in paragraph 2 to order an evidentiary hearing ". .
. to establish the amount of reimbursement due to Defendants Bagley
SL Company and/or Foothills Water Company for the reasonable value
of improvements made by Defendant Bagley & Company." (R. 896).
Finally, in paragraph 3, the Court stated "(A)n Order Quieting
Title to the water system, in the name of Plaintiff, will issue
upon payment in full by Plaintiff to Defendant of the Court's
Reimbursement Order fqr Improvements by the Defendant to the
Plaintiff's water system for the years 1974 to 1985."
supplied) (R. 896).

12

(Emphasis

A.

The Homeowners should not have been required to pay
for the water right.

Although ruling initially in its "Order on Ownership Issues"
that the Homeowners would be given a Quiet Title Order to the water
system upon reimbursement to Appellees Bagley & Company and/or
Foothills Water Company for the reasonable value of improvements
made by Appellee Bagley & Company, the Court caused great confusion
by expanding its inquiry at the time of the valuation portion of
the trial (July 30, 31, and August 1, 1990). The Court allowed and
required the parties to present evidence regarding the value of the
water right in question, Application No. 33130 (59-1608) also
referred to as the "Glazier Well Water Right".
After the parties had submitted the ownership portion of the
trial to the Court by stipulation (R* 452), the Court entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated October 20, 1989 (R.
899-904).

Finding of Fact No. 4 as it related to the water right

in this case reads as follows:
"4. Plaintiff, Hi-Country Estate Homeowners
Association, obtained legal right, title and
interest in the disputed water system from the
following sources:

(f) An Assignment from Hi-Country Estates,
Inc., to Plaintiff, of the disputed water
rights.
(g) An acknowledgment by the State Engineer's Division of Water Rights that the
Plaintiff is owner of the water rights, more
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specifically, water right referred to in this
action as the Glazier Well Water Right."
Add- 4 p. 4 (R. 901, 902).
Despite this clear finding by the Court that the Appellant was
the legal owner of this disputed water right and a recitation of
the chain of ownership, the Court expanded its inquiry at the
valuation portion of the trial to include the value of the water
right.

In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law after the

valuation portion of the trial, the Court found as a matter of
fact:
"9. The Homeowners Association will be unjustly enriched unless they reimburse Foothills Water Company, as successor-in-interest
to Bagley & Company, for the fair amount of
the entire water system, the improvements made
thereon from 1974 to 1985 and the water right.
(Emphasis supplied).
Add. 5 p. 4; R. 1623.
Furthermore, in its Conclusions of Law, the Court stated:
"2.
The Homeowners Association must pay
Foothills Water Company the total sum of
$98,500.00 for the value of the water system
and water right." (Emphasis supplied).
Add. 5 p. 5; R. 1624.
Finally, in the Court's "Order Regarding Amount Payable by
Plaintiff for Subject Water System11, the Court ruled:
"The Plaintiff is entitled to an Order Quieting Title to the water system within the
boundaries of Hi-Country Estates Subdivision
Phase I, and the water right represented by
Application No.» 33130 (59-1608) on file with
Utah State Department of Natural Resources,
Division of Water Rights and the Utah State

Engineer's Office, upon payment of the sum of
598,500.00 to Foothills Water Company. Such
amount shall be payable in full no later
August 15, 1991. The unpaid balance is interest free." (Emphasis supplied).
Add. 6 p. 2; R. 1627.
It seems incredible to the Homeowners that they should be
found to have owned the water right and yet be required to pay
Foothills in order to obtain a Quiet Title Order to said water
right.
Appellant clearly established title to the water right in
question by presenting documents showing the chain at trial.
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 15 (Add. 7; R. 1359, 1400) is a certified
copy of a document on file with the Department of Natural Resources, Division of Water Rights, showing a transfer of the water right
in question from Joseph Butterfield to Hi-County Estates, Inc., in
May of 1971.

Hi-Country Estates, Inc., was stipulated by the

parties to be the general partner of the limited partnership known
as Hi-Country Estates Second in the development of Hi-Country
Estates Subdivision Phase I (R. 569).
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 16 (Add. 8; R. 1359, 1402) is an
Assignment of Application for the same water right showing a
transfer by Charles E. Lewton, one of the original developers of
the subdivision and principal of Hi-Country Estates, Inc., to the
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association dated June 28, 1985.
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 17 (Add. 9; R. 1359, 1404) is a letter
from Marge Tempest in the title section of the State Department of
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Natural Resources, Division of Water Rights, indicating that the
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association does in fact own the
water right in question according to their office's records.
Although a subsequent Assignment of Application of the same
water right was apparently prepared by Appellee Gerald H. Bagley
allegedly on behalf of Hi-Country Estates, Inc., assigning the
water right in question to Foothills Water Company, said document
was not signed until February 25, 1987, almost two years after HiCountry Estates, Inc., had made the Assignment in question to the
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association (Add. 10; R. 1359, 1406).
Said document was admitted at trial as Plaintiff's Exhibit 21 with
a letter from the same Marge Tempest of the State Department of
Natural Resources, Division of Water Rights, rejecting Foothills1
effort to file this Assignment of Application with their department
due to the fact that a previous Assignment had been made by HiCountry Estates, Inc. to Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association
of the same water right (Add. 11; R. 1359, 1407).
Therefore,

by

awarding

Foothills

some

portion

of

the

$98,500.00 as value for the water right, the Court made a very
unfair

and unjust

decision.

It awarded Appellees value for

something they did not own according to the official public records
of ownership in the Utah State Engineer's Office, and the Assignment of Application by Hi-Country Estates, Inc. in 1985 to the
Homeowners.
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Furthermore, this water right was paid for by the Homeowners
through their purchase of lots, since the original developers have
admitted they recovered the value of the water system through the
sale of the lots.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 20, Add. 12; R. 1359, 1650

pp. 29, 30; R. 1409-1411.

Although Appellee Gerald H. Bagley

testified differently at trial, his deposition was taken prior to
trial on April 12, 1988.

The following exchange took place:

W

Q. But it was your understanding that ultimately the money that was recovered, you would
recover your investment in the water system by
selling lots; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q. You've been involved in other real estate
development; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q. Is that consistent with what we've just
discussed with the way you funded the cost of
what I'll call common improvements, water
systems, roads, etc., in those other projects?
A. I would say it is consistent, yes, except
we did it differently on the Jeremy Ranch, but
in that case the people had to go separately,
buy a share of water.
Q.

Was that a mutual stock?

A.

It's a mutual stock company.
R. 1650 pp. 29, 30.

Mr. Bagley admitted his memory was better during his deposition on April 12, 1988, than it was during trial on July 31, 1990,
when he said he did not intend to recover the cost of the water
system in the sale of lots (R. 2242).
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In addition, Mr. Bagley was

one of only three developers of the subdivision, and he indicated
at trial that he didn't know if the other two developers, Lewton
and Spencer, had built in the cost of the water system in lot sales
during the period of time he had sold out to them and they had
established the costs to be recovered in the sale of lots (R. 2244,
2245).
Therefore, it seems incomprehensible that the Court required
the purchasers of the lots (who are shareholding members of the
Appellant) to pay any value a second time for the water right, and
indeed the component parts of the water system in general.

(See

infra subpoint B ) . Appellant respectfully requests that the Courtf s
Order requiring whatever portion of the $98,500*00 was allocated by
the trial judge to the water right (and this is unknown from the
Court's Orders), be reversed.
B.

The Homeowners have already paid for the water
system and should not be required to pay a second
time.

It is the Homeowners' position that the original developers
recovered the value of the water system through the sale of lots in
Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I.

The testimony by deposi-

tion of Mr. Gerald H. Bagley on April 12, 1988, cited supra
thoroughly supports this position.
tion was

elicited

by

attorney

The testimony in that deposi-

T. Patrick

Casey

representing

Appellees Foothills Water Company and J. Rodney Dansie.
Mr. Bagley's opposite testimony at trial is a clear example of
how unbelievable and incredible Appellees' witnesses were in this
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matter. Appellant submits that this clear reversal of testimony by
Mr. Bagley shows the lengths to which Appellees went to have the
Court place a high value on this water system, when they have
already been compensated for the system through the sale of the
lots.
Of course, Mr. Bagley had a very specific interest in seeing
that this Court awarded a high value with regard to the water
system.

He testified he satisfied debts and obligations to J.

Rodney Dansie by ostensibly transferring this water system to him
in October of 1985 (during the pendency of this lawsuit), and would
stand to be liable to Mr. Dansie for some $80,000.00 to $148,000.00
(depending upon which Appellee is believed) if this Court had
issued a Quiet Title Order to the Homeowners (R. 2251, 2252).
John Thomas, a real estate agent who had resided in Hi-Country
Estates

Subdivision

Phase I for 19 years

at time of trial,

testified he was originally employed by Mr. Spencer and Mr. Lewton
as project manager for the development in approximately 1971 (R.
2087, 2088).

Mr. Thomas testified he sold approximately 90 of the

121 lots available in Phase I of the subdivision himself (R. 2088).
Mr. Thomas further testified that he was the manager of the water
system employed by the original developers (R. 2088, 2089).

Mr.

Thomas testified that he had been authorized by Mr. Spencer and Mr.
Lewton,

(who had bought out Mr. Bagley at the time and were

responsible for the development of the subdivision through HiCountry

Estates

Second,

and

its
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general

partner,

Hi-Country

Estates, Inc.),

to inform potential lot purchasers " . . . that the

property owners association was to own the water system, at the
time that the developers turned the property back or over to them,
activated the property owners association. . ." (R. 2090).

Mr.

Thomas further testified that the lots would have been worthless to
a prospective purchaser without the water system (R. 2091).
William Turner was called by Appellant and testified that he
was a member of the Homeowners Association and had first bought his
lot in 1972 from Mr. Thomas. He testified that he understood when
he purchased the lot that the water system " • . . belonged to the
Association. • ."

and that the value of the water system was

recovered by the original developer in the price of the lot that he
paid (R. 2101, 2102).
Mr. W. Norman Sims was called to testify at the trial.

He

stated that he was president of Appellant Homeowners Association
and a member of the Board of Directors. He testified he purchased
two lots in Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I in 1980 (R.
2105).

He further testified that it was his opinion that the lot

owners had paid for the water system when they bought their lots,
and that "the expenditure for a water system was paid for once.
Everyone else buying that understood and it was represented that
the water system is theirs."

(R. 2135, 2136).

More specifically,

Mr. Sims testified:
"We paid for the (water) system when we bought
our property, and this would go with the land,
and once it is paid for, every time that this
20

land would change hands, when I bought my
property, it had been sold once previously, on
both lots that I had, one which I still maintain, (sic) It was my understanding that the
water system had been paid for, and was in
place, and the only additional cost of that
type would be whatever that hook-up cost would
be to tie into that system itself."
R. 2143.
Other than the trial testimony of Mr. Bagley, which was
impeached by his April 12, 1988, deposition testimony as aforementioned,

counsel does not recall that any additional evidence

whatsoever was presented by Appellees to contradict the clear
evidence presented that the value of the water system had been
built into the price of the lots when originally sold by the
developers.

In fact, in the deposition of Charles Lewton, one of

the original developers and a principal in Hi-Country Estates,
Inc., Mr. Lewton testified that the reason the Homeowners Association was created by the developers originally was so that they
could take over the "amenities" that would service all of the lot
owners.

When asked what the types of amenities were he was

referring to, Mr. Lewton responded:
"Well, I know the roads and the gate and the
water system.
And I don't know how it was
left when we left here. I personally don't
know.
I do know that since day one, we'd
intended for Salt Lake City Conservancy, and I
know that they were to come in, and what that
means, I don't know at this point.
I know
they were to take the system over."
R. 1655 p. 39.
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This testimony by one of the original developers seems to be
a clear impeachment of the trial testimony of Mr. Bagley.

See R.

2239, 2240.
The conclusion that must be drawn from this is that the Court
originally made the right decision in finding that Appellant
Homeowners were "the legal owners of the disputed water system,
which includes the water rights, the water lots, the water tanks,
and the water lines" (Add. 1). However, when the Court made the
further determination that the Homeowners would not be given an
order quieting title to the water system and the water right until
such time as they had paid $98,500.00 to Foothills Water Company,
the Court was clearly requiring the Homeowners to pay twice for
this water system (R. 1627).

The order of the Court should be

reversed and the case remanded with instructions to the lower court
to issue a Quiet Title Order without the requirement of a payment
of additional monies by the Homeowners.
C,

The water system in this case has little value to
anyone but Appellant, but at any rate is worth no
more than $27,650.00.

Appellant introduced at trial the testimony of Jon Strawn,
former Chief Rate Engineer for the Division of Public Utilities,
who testified Foothills Water Company has reported a substantial
loss every year between 1985 and the present to the Public Service
Conunission (R. 1995, 1996). Further, Appellant admitted stipulated
Exhibit CCC as Plaintiff's Exhibit 13 in the trial, which was a
document summarizing the net operating losses incurred by Foothills
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Water Company (submitted by Appellee originally to the Court), as
showing a total net loss between 1985 and September 1, 1988, of
$250,004.00 for that period of time (Add. 13; R. 1359, 1454).

In

addition, stipulated Exhibit AAA admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 12
shows the losses incurred by Bagley & Company between 1975 and 1984
to have been $271,717.00 (Add. 14; R. 1359, 1456).
Mr. Strawn went on to testify at trial as follows:
"Q. . . . Does the system have any value on
the open market to anyone, in light of the
fact that its expenses far exceed its revenues?
A. Not in my opinion. As I said before, it
would have a negative net present value.
Therefore, anybody that would invest in that,
if it was a private investor, would be regulated by the public utility — by the Public
Service Commission.
There would be a nonallowance of rate base.
Therefore, there
would be no rate of return on any rate base.
Therefore, in my opinion, it would have negative net present value, and not be worth
anything on the market, because its expenses
exceed its revenues, and that gives you a
negative net present value.
Q. So the Court will understand this, what
you are saying is if anyone purchased this
water system on the open market, they would
never be able to recover the cost of their
purchase price from the Public Service Commission; is that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q. They could not build that into rate base,
and the purchase price would simply be lost;
is that correct?
A.
That's correct.
Plus, in my opinion,
Foothills Water Company has reached its price
inelasticity, which means when the rates were
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set on 60 customers and now we only have 48,
basically the — you are losing revenues.
They are in what we call a death spiral, a
downward spiral. No matter what prices you
raise the rates to, people would simply leave
the system. It has been shown through various
complaints to me that people can go out and
drill their own well out there, and take a
loan from the bank, and pay that back at
cheaper rates than what they can purchase
water from Foothills Water Company. That is
what has caused people to jump to basically
get off the system and drill their own wells. H
(Emphasis supplied).
R. 1998, 1999.
Apparently, the Court in this case completely disregarded Mr.
Strawn9s opinion; yet as Chief Rate Engineer for the Division of
Public Utilities, his opinions should have been carefully considered by the Court.
Appellant called Mr. John Probasco, the civil engineer from
Busch & Gudgell,. Inc., who originally designed and installed the
first phase of the water system in Hi-Country Estates Subdivision,
who testified "the system has little value if any, to anybody but
the homeowners in Hi-Country"

(R. 2047, 2055, 2057). He testified

his opinion of the value of the improvements between 1974 and the
present is $13,376.69 (R. 2052); but that it would cost a new owner
$160,300.00 to bring this antiquated water system up to appropriate
standards (R. 2053, 2055).
Appellant called Mr. Richard Ellis, assistant treasurer for
the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District, who has been
involved in negotiations with Foothills to purchase the water
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system.

He testified that in his opinion the whole system, tanks,

lines, lots and all is worth a maximum of $27,650.00 (R. 2080).
His valuation was accepted by the Board of Directors of the
District (Add. 16; Trial Exhibit 10; R. 1359).
Foothills called two witnesses to establish value. Stanley S.
Postma placed the value of the system (combining three different
valuation methods) at between $409,000.00 and $482,000.00 (R. 2173)
and

he

valued

the

water

right

at

between

$149,000.00

and

$182,000.00 (R. 2171).
Seth Schick, hired a week prior to trial by Foothills, is an
engineer who testified he thought the value of the water system was
$110,000.00 to $115,000.00 more than Postma's value (therefore
between $524,000.00 and $607,000.00) (R. 2288).

Mr. Schick valued

the water right at $359,000.00 (R. 2275).
These bloated values of the system and water right (disagreed
upon by Foothills' own witnesses) had to clearly have been rejected
by the trial judge when he reached the combined value of the water
right and water system at $98,500.00.
Appellant submits that the judge, while merely plucking a
figure out of the air, was not about to be persuaded by the
outrageous estimates of Foothills' experts for a water system that
has never shown a net profit.
Appellant

believes

the

(See Point II, subpoint C supra).
judge's

erroneous and should be reversed.
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conclusion

was

clearly

ADDENDUM 6

WELL LEASE AND WATER LINE EXTENSION AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this

/^~-day

of April,

1977, by and between JESSE H. DANSIE, hereinafter referred to as
•Dansie", and GERALD H. BAGLEY, hereinafter referred to as "Bagley",
W I T N E S S E T H

:

WHEREAS, Dansie is the owner of property located in Sections
33, 34 and 35, Township 3 South, Ranqe 2 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, and is also the owner of water rights evidenced by
Certificate No. 8212 Application No. 26451, and the rights to
water therefrom and a water distribution system located on such
property; and
WHEREAS, Bagley is the owner of property located in Section
33, Township 3 South, Range 2 West, and Sections 1, 2, 4, 5, and
11, Township 4 South, Range 2 West Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
and is also the owner of a water distribution system located on
part of the property owned by him; and
WHEREAS, Dansie and Bagley desire to connect their water
systems and make use of the Dansie well and water for their
mutual benefit, upon the terms and conditions provided herein:
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants
hereinafter provided, the parties hereto agree as follows:
A.

WELL LEASE
1.

Dansie hereby leases to Bagley the well located South

758 Feet and East 1350 Feet from the West quarter corner of
Section 33, Township 3 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, identified by Certificate No. 26451 issued by the Utah
State Engineer's Office, hereinafter referred to as "Dansie Well
No. 1", including the equipment for operation of such well and the
rights to all of the water therefrom, for a period of ten (10)
years from the date of this Agreement.

2.

Bag ley shall pay to Dansie Five Thousand One Hundred

Dollars ($5,100.00) the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,
and as rental for such lease, Bagley shall pay to Dansie $300.00
each month during the first five years of this lease commencing
April 10, 1977, provided the monthly rental shall be increased to
$600.00 per month at such time as thirty (30) additional hook-ups
are installed on the Hi-Country Water Company Distribution System
operated by Bagley*

As of the date of this Agreement, there are

28 hook-ups, such hook-ups being detailed in Exhibit II.
3.

Commencing April 10, 1982, the monthly rental payments

shall be increased to $600.00 per month unless they have already
been increased to that amount pursuant to Paragraph 2 above.
4.

Bagley shall have the right to renew this Well Lease on

terms to be agreed to by Bagley and Dansie at the termination of
this Lease on April 10, 1987.
S\

Bagley agrees to provide and install a seal around the

well pipe of Dansie Well No. 1 as required to meet the Utah State
Division of Health standards and to install a new pump on the
well within the first five (5) years of this lease and shall be
responsible for all maintenance of Dansie Well No. 1 during the
term of this lease.
6.

Bagley agrees to pay all pumping costs, repairs, and

maintenance of said well for the period of this Agreement. Bagley
agrees to maintain the said well, and electric motor in good
operating condition.

Any changes or modifications to said well,

motor and pumping equipment shall be paid for by Bagley and will
become the property of Dansie at the termination of this Agreement.
7.

The existing pump, electric motor and transformers will

remain the property of Dansie and will be delivered to Dansie if
removed from said well.

Any new equipment to be installed in

said well such as an electric motor, pumps and transformers and
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piping shall become the property of Dansie and shall be free and
clear of any mortgages, liens or encumbrances at the termination
of this Agreement.
8.

Bagley agrees for himself, his successors, and assigns

to be responsible for and to indemnify Dansie, his successors
and assigns, against any and all liability, losses and damages,
of any nature whatever, and charges and expenses, including court
costs and attorneys' fees that Dansie may sustain or be put to
and which arise out of the operations, rights and obligations of
Bagley pursuant to this Agreement whether such liability, loss,
damage charges or expenses are the result of the actions or
ommissions of Bagley, his employees, agents or otherwise.
9.

Dansie does not warrant that the water from Dansie Well No.

does now or at any time during the term of this Agreement, and any
extension thereof, will meet any standards for culinary water as
required by the Utah State Division of Health.

However, a letter

of approval of the water by the Utah State Board of Health is
attached (Exhibit 12) and the requirements are set forth in said
letter.
B.

EXTENSION WO. 1
1.

Within one year from the date hereof, Dansie shall with

his equipment perform all labor required to excavate for and
install a 5-inch £«<V«C. Class 200 pipeline connecting the Dansie
Well No. 1 to the existing Hi-Country Water Company water system
owned by Bagley at a point in Lot 19 as referenced by the map in
Exhibit II.

Bagley shall purchase and furnish all permits, pipe,

materials and supplies required for this connection and shall
obtain an easement across Lot 19 at his expense.
2.

Dansie shall own the line upon completion of the work

and Bagley shall be able to use said line during the term of this
Agreement.

Bagley shall have a right to enter the property

upon which the pipeline and connection is located for the purpose
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of installing, maintaining and using the water line to be installed
thereon pursuant to Paragraph B (1) above.

Bagley hereby grants

and conveys to Dansie an easement and right-of-way over and
across property in the Hi-Country Estate Subdivision for the same
purpose. Dansie shall have a right to take water from the line at
points that may serve the property along the line of Extension
No. 1. Dansie shall own and Bagley will be responsible for
maintenance of the extension during the life of this Agreement.
C.

EXTENSION NO. 2
1.

Within one year from the date hereof, Dansie shall, with

his equipment and at his expense, perform all labor raquirad to
excavate for and install a 6-inch P.V.C. Class 200 pipeline
connecting the Hi-Country Estates Water Company water system,
from its moat Easterly point at approximataly 7350 West and 13300
South in Salt Lake County, to the Dansie water line at approximataly
7200 Wast and 13300 South, including a pressure-reducing valve at
tha point of connection with the Hi-Country Estates Watar Company
system at 7350 West 13300 South.

Dansie shall purchase and

furnish all pipe, materials and supplies required for this connection.
2.

Dansie shall obtain and provide all easements and permits

and pay all fees required for this connection and extension, except
as for aueh line that may be on property of Ui-Country Homeowners
Association or Bagley.
3.

Dansie shall own and be responsible for all maintenance

of this Extension No. 2.
4.

Bagley shall have the right, at all times during the

term of this Agreement or any extension thereof, to run water from
the Hi-Country Eatates Watar Company system through the Danaia
watar system and Extension No. 1 and No. 2 and No. 3 to property
owned by Bagley in Sections 1, 2, and 11, Township 4 South, Range
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
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D.

EXTENSION NO, 3
1.

Within one year from the date hereof, Dansie shall, with

his equipment perform all labor required to excavate for and
install a 6-inch P.V.C. Class 200 pipeline connecting to the
Dansie water system at 6800 West and 13000 South in Salt Lake
County and extending along 6800 West to 13400 South.

Bagley shall

purchase and furnish all permits, pipe, materials and supplies
required for this connection and extension.
2.

Dansie shall own and Bagley shall be responsible for all

maintenance of this Extension No. 3 during the life of this Agreement.
E.

OTHER WELLS AND HOOK-UPS
1.

Dansie shall have the right, at his expense, to connect

any additional wells owned by him, located in Section 33, 34 and 35,
Township 3 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian identified
by Certificate No. _ _ _ _

issued by the Utah State Engineers

Office, hereinafter referred to as "Dansie Wells" and by change
application No. 9-8635 (59-3879) issued by the Utah State Engineers
Offiee, hereinafter referred to as "Dansie Well No. 3," to the
water system owned by Dansie, including Extension No. 2, and to
commingle the water from these wells with that in the system from
other sources so long as the water from such wells at all times
*eet all standards for culinary water required by the Utah State
Division of Health.
2.

Dansie shall have the right to receive up to five (5)

residential hook-ups onto the water system on the Dansie property
for members of his immediate family without any payment of hook-up
fees and shall further have the right to receive reasonable amounts
of water from the system through these five (5) hook-ups for
culinalry and yard irrigation at no cost.
3.

Dansie shall further have the right to receive up to fifty

(50) residential hook-ups onto the water system orv the Dansie
property for which no hook-up fees will be charged.
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Water service

charges shall be charged to the recipients thereof of which
Dansie shall receive fifty percent (501) of the water service
billings paid by those recipients in consideration for Dansie1s
maintenance of his part of the water system.
4.

Dansie shall receive not less than $4,000.00 or One

Hundred percent (100%) of all of the hook-up fees to the water
system on the Leon property located between the Hi-Country Estates
property in Sections 33, Township 3 South, Range 2 West, and the
Dansie property in Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 2 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian and shall receive fifty percent (501)
of the revenues from water service charges to such property.
5.

Dansie shall have the right to use for any purposes and

at no cost, any excess water from the Hi-Country Estates Water
Company system Well No. 1, not required or being used by Bagley
or customers of the Hi-Country Estates Water Company.

Any power

or other costs of pumping such excess water shall be paid by
Dansie.

F.

MWCEiajoreogs
1.

It is understood that Bagley intends to use the entire

water system formed by the extensions and connections provided for
herein, including the present systems owned by Bagley and Dansie,
for the purpose of providing water to users in the area covered
by this system or which can be reached by extensions and connections
to this system, that Bagley intends to charge hook-up and water
service fees to water users, that Bagley is entitled to all such
fees and other charges except as otherwise provided in this
Agreement, and that Bagley is responsible for all costs of other
extensions and connections except as otherwise provided in this
Agreement.
2.

Dansie agrees that Bagley may form a.water company, using

such entity or form of organization as Bagley desires, and may
convey all his rights to the water system referred to in this
Agreement and assign his interest in this Agreement to any such
-6-

entity or organization.

Bagley will be personally responsible

for lease terms and conditions if assignee fails to meet the
terms and conditions of the lease.

No assignment, conveyance or

sublease shall release Bagley from liabilities and obligation
under this Agreement.
3.

Oansie further agrees that Bagley may apply to the Utah

Public Service Commission for such permits or approvals as may be
required and Dansie shall cooperate fully in all respects as may
be required to obtain such permits or approvals as may be required
by the Public Service Commission.

m

Bagley agrees to pay all costs

incurred in obtaining such approval, including but not limited to,
legal and engineering fees.
4.

Bagley and Dansie each agree to execute and deliver any

additional documents and/or easements which may be necessary to
carry out the provisions and intent of this Agreement.
5. Non-payment of any monthly installment will, at the
option of Dansie, automatically terminate this Agreement.

All

remaining lease payments, in the event of termination for nonpayment of any monthly installment, shall become immediately due
and payable to Dansie.

If it becomes necessary for Dansie to sue

for the liquidated damages (remaining lease payments), Bagley
shall pay attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Dansie.
6.

Dansie shall have first right of refusal to purchase

the entire Hi-Country water system if it is to be sold or assigned
to a third party.
7.

Bagley, and his assigns or successors, agree to supply

water to the Dansie property as provided for in this Agreement and
for such time beyond the expiration or termination of this Agreement
as water is supplied to any of the Hi-Country properties or that the
lines and water system referred to in this Agreement are in existence
and water is being supplied from another source such as Salt Lake
County Conservancy District.

Such water as is provided subsequent

-7-

to the expiration or termination of this Agreement shall be made
available upon the same terms, conditions and rates as are set
forth

in this Agreement.
DATED this

7-

day of April, 1377.

UhKAU) U. BAGif
^

^

AMENDMENT TO WELL LEASE AND WATER LINE EXTENSION AGREEMENT

into this &J-

This Amendment made and entered
of July, 1985, by and
referred

to as

between Jesse

•Dansie,' and

Gerald

day

H. Dansie, hereinafter
H.

Bagley,

hereinafter

referred to as •Bagley."
W I T N E S S E T H
WHEREAS, Dansie and Bagley, on April 7, 1977, entered
into a Well Leas-e and Water Line Extension Agreement (hereinafter 'Well Lease Agreement'); and
WHEREAS,
possible

Dansie

ambiguities

and

Bagley

in Paragraph

E.

are
2. of

concerned
the Well

about
Lease

Agreement; and
WHEREAS, the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association
has filed a lawsuit based in part on.interpretation of the Well
Lease Agreement; and
WHEREAS, Bagley is delinquent

in the payment of his

monthly rental payments, but desires 'to continue the Well Lease
Agreement;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of. $10.00 (Ten) and
other good and valuable consideration, the sufficiency of which
is hereby admitted, Dansie and Bagley agree as follows:
1.

Paragraph E. 2.

of the April 7, 1977 Well Leas**

Agreement is amended to read as follows:
2.
Dansie shall have the right to receive
up to five (5) residential hook-ups on to
the water system on the Dansie property for

members of his immediate family without any
payment of hook-up fees and shall further
hav- the right to receive up to 12 million
(12,000,000) gallons of water per year from
the combined water system at no cost for
culinary and yard irrigation use on the
Dansie property described herein plus Lot 51
of Hi-Country Estates. Any meters required
at any time by any person or entity for
metering
of
Dansie's
water
shall
be
ourchased and installed by Bagley at no cost
:o Dansie* Any use of water for the fighting of fires, or losses caused by breaks or
line ruptures shall not be charged against
the 12,000,000 gallons to which Dansie is
otherwise entitled,
2.

Paragraph E.5. of the April 7, 1977 Well Lease

Agreement is amended to read as follows:
5. Dansie shall have the right to use for
any purpose and at no cost, any excess water
from the High Country Estates Water Company
System Well No. 1, not required or being
used by Bagley or customers of the High
County Estates Water Company. Dansie shall
pay only the incremental pumping power costs
associated with producing such excess water.
3.

All other provisions of the Well Lease Agreement

shall remain in full force and effect.
4.

Nothing

herein

shall

relieve

Bagley

from

the

obligation to make the monthly payments now delinquent or to
become due under the Well Lease Agreement.
4.
amended

This Amendment and the Well Lease Agreement as

herewith,

shall

be

binding

upon

and

inure

to

the

benefit of the respective parties hereto, their successors and
assigns.
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ADDENDUM 7

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 1977 WELL LEASE
AND WATER TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT WAS A VALID ENCUMBRANCE ON THE WATER SYSTEM.
The Court ruled in its "Order Regarding Amount Payable by
Plaintiff for Subject Water System":
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"1. The encumbrance of the water system which
is the subject of this action represented by
the Well Lease and Water Transportation Agreement entered into in 1977 between Gerald H.
Bagley and Jesse Dansie is and remains a valid
encumbrance upon the subject water system, and
requires the owner of the subject water system
to permit the Dansie family to receive and
transport, free of charge, water through the
subject system in the amount of twelve million
gallons per year or such larger amount as
shall be permitted by the excess capacity of
the system as long as the system exists and is
operative."
(R. 1627).
The

1977 Well

Lease

and

Water

Transportation

Agreement

(attached as Add. 15 and admitted into evidence in the trial of
this matter as Plaintifffs Exhibit 11, R. 1359, 1857-1867) was
construed by the Public Service Commission as outlined in Point III
of this brief supra.

In addition to the fact that the Public

Service Commission in its Report and Order dated March 17, 1986
(Add.

2; R.

1044-1083) found

this Agreement

to be

"grossly

unreasonable" and "showering virtually limitless benefits on Jesse
Dansie and the members of his immediate family", the P.S.C. found
that paragraph F. 2 of this Agreement " . . . makes Bagley personally responsible to fulfill the terms and conditions of the lease,
whether or not a water company is created to which Bagley conveys
or assigns the Well Lease Agreement." (R. 1056).
Based upon these findings of unreasonableness, the P.S.C.
issued its Order dated March 17, 1986, requiring Foothills to
" . . . obtain approval from this Commission before entering into
43

any future lease or sales agreements for the provision of water to
Foothills' service area or any amendment to or assignment of any
lease or sales agreement that is now in force or effect."
1079).

(R.

No evidence was presented in the lower court, and it is

simply incontroverted, that Foothills has failed to obtain the
approval of the Public Service Commission for any amendment to or
extension

of this

1977 Well

Lease

and Water

Line

Extension

Agreement. The Agreement by its own terms in paragraph A. 4 states
that

it terminates on April

10, 1987.

Where the Agreement

terminated on that date, and no extensions of the Agreement have
been approved by the P.S.C., it is unconscionable for the lower
court to have made Homeowners' Quiet Title Order subject to this
alleged "encumbrance" on the water system.
Homeowners were not parties to this Agreement; and to impose
its "grossly unreasonable" terms upon them would be unfair and
unjust, because they are the persons the Agreement was supposed to
have benefited in the first place.
In addition to the foregoing, the P.S.C. in its Report and
Order of 1986 states that:
"While no one can blame Mr. Dansie for desiring to provide free water to his children in
virtual perpetuity, this Commission would be
abrogating its statutory duty were we to
impose such a burden on Foothills' present and
future customers. . .
. . . We find that it
unreasonable to expect
customers to support the
Well Lease Agreement • •
44
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j
,
i i

| ii, i

because no evidence was submitted during the trial

of this matter by Appellees
encumbrance

Agreement should be an

'the water system.

entei

The failure of a rnai. no urt to

requires that the judgment be vacated.

Anderson v, Utah County Bd. of County Comm'rs, riflrJ P.2d 1214 (Utah
1979).

There

only a single Finding of Fact relating tc the
» is Finding of Fact No. 5:

Agreement,

"That certain Well Lease and water Line Extension Agreement entered into by and between Dr.
Gerald H. Bagley and Jesse Dansie in 1977 was
and is a valid and fully binding encumbrance
on the subject water system, mandating that
the owners of the Dansie family property
described therein are entitled, without
charge, to obtain water from the water system
from the Dansie Well located on property
adjacent to Hi-Country Estates Phase I Subdivision to the Dansie property, in the amount
of either twelve million gallons per year or
such larger amount as the excess capacity of
the system shall permit, as long as the system
exists and is operative.
That encumbrance
does not in any way legally burden the water
system or the owner or operator of the water
system." (Emphasis supplied).
(

This Finding

*

is internally inconsistem

that the Agreem€
subject water system

).

It states

id arid fully binding encumbrance on the
then in the last sentence suggests 1 licit

imbrance "does not

ay legally burden the water
i /atIT system

system or the owner or operate.
of Fact is simply incomprehensible!
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Finding

Furthermore, Finding of Fact

No. 5 is not a legitimate Finding of Fact, but constitutes a
Conclusion of Law.
The Conclusion of Law reached by the Court on this issue is
"(T)he encumbrance to the subject water system and water right
represented by the Well Lease and Water Line Extension Agreement
entered into between Gerald H. Bagley and Jesse Dansie, entitles
Foothills Water Company to continue to use the system to serve
customers within its service area but outside of Hi-Country Estates
Phase I" (R. 1624).

In light of Finding of Fact No. 5 this

Conclusion of Law seems just as inconsistent. What does it mean?
The judge refers to "water right" here but the Agreement nowhere
mentions "water right". It is the lease of a well! Interestingly
enough, with a few minor exceptions, the "Order Regarding Amount
Payable by Plaintiff for Subject Water System" paragraph 1, is
almost verbatim the same as Finding of Fact No. 51
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ADDENDUM 8

POINT
APPELLEES HAVE FAILED TO SUBSTANTIVELY RESPOND TO
HOMEOWNERS' ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT'S ORIGINAL
DECISION TO QUIET TITLE IN HOMEOWNERS, BUT SUBJECT
TO THE 1977 WELL LEASE AGREEMENT AND CONTINUED
TRANSPORTATION OF WATER THROUGH THE SYSTEM BY
FOOTHILLS, WAS ERRONEOUS.
1'

i*s

.D(? r

'

^-'Pt

H"inuHugrif.M

initial decision tr enter a qu I M

n i it»il t h a i

t h<

wei

:oui 1 s

t itle order in its favor

subject to t.ie 13 7/ welx Lease Agreement between Gerald H

but

Baq PV

and Jesse Dans^e to transport free water through the system to the
4U

Dansie family was unfair, unjust and erroneous.
pp. 42-47)*

Homeowners pointed

out that

(H.O. Op. Br. at

the Public Service

Commission in its Report and Order dated March 17, 1986 had found
this

Agreement

to

be

"grossly

unreasonable"

and

"showering

virtually limitless benefits on Jesse Dansie and the members of his
immediate family."
been

a

party

unreasonable

Homeowners also pointed out that it had not

to

this

terms

Agreement

upon

them

and

would

to
be

impose

its

grossly

unfair

and

unjust.

Furthermore, Homeowners argued that the Agreement expired by its
own terms on April 10, 1987 and no document of renewal in any form
was presented to the trial court.

Finally, Homeowners argued that

Finding of Fact No. 5, upon which the court's order was based, was
internally inconsistent and ambiguous (R.1622).
Foothills responded to these arguments with less than a half
a page in its brief (Cons. In. Br. of Foothills W.C., at pg. 43).
Despite the fact that the Public Service Commission in its March
17, 1986 Report and Order had ruled that the Agreement was grossly
unreasonable and ordered Foothills Water Company to obtain its
approval before entering into any future lease or sales agreement
for the provision of water to Foothills' service area (R.1079),
Foothills

argues

that

"[T]he

encumbrance

was,

if

anything,

recognized and validated by the Public Service Commission."
statement is simply false!

This

Foothills' refusal to even respond to
41

the argument that the Agreement expireiJ on L L S ! cm e on A(,u i 1 Iff,
1987, shows that It simply has n o basis u p o n w h i c h it: can argue
that the judge's UJ dh

ijph*>i»i w •

egard t o that Agreement.

Furthermore, Homeowners argued
coui t '" si i n j "•
water system

opeiunq In .i e I: I hiat I In-

d e c i s i o n to p r o v i d e a q u i e t t i t l e o r d e r
Homeowner

to the

a l l o w i n g F o o t h i l l s tn

c o n t i n u e t o t r a n s p o r t w a t e r t h r o u g h t h e s y s t e m t o c u s t o m e r s jutti le
of 1 1, I Con m t r > Estates Subdivision Phase 1

k mil w«*l« presented to the

Homeowners argued that no ev.
lower court

-

was clearly erroneous.

justify this p o r t i o n of the order

Homeow

in addition,

appropriate finding of fact or conclusion

of law w a s entered by the court to support

Lhis provi s'lun, M H 1

therefore that portion of the order should be vacated upon remand.
(H C

J'IJ ,

hi

.f I 4 • 4 '-*

:

'

"

Foothills simply argues in its Consolidated Initial Briet that
this issue is m o o t .

However, Homeowners are requesting that this

Court reverse the lowfi

'iiiciqimei I HI qu i p(;( i mqi r j t 1 cj to

U'NII I

the

w a t e r system and water right in Foothills and remand the case with
instructions *-M enter a quiet title order In favor of Homeowners.
H o m e o w n e r s also ask that

t.Jiib O nxi" t, i, iiiv,fi 1 i da tie this encumbrax ice

requiring Homeowners to allow Foothills to transport water through
jts system !,,

M it ride • ustomers.

Only in this way can the court's

d e t e r m i n a t i o n be truly fair and just.
42

Even though an appellate

court may reverse a judgment due to any number of reasons, it does
have the power to review and decide matters which may become
material when a case is remanded for further proceedings. LeGrand
Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, supra; Anderson v. Utah County Board of
County Commissioners, supra.
It is to be noted that Appellees Bagleys do not even address
the issues contained in this Point.
POINT

VI

FOOTHILLS1 CLAIMS FOR SLANDER OF TITLE WERE
APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
In its Consolidated Initial Brief ^Foothills argues^thatrthere" -~
was "undisputed evidencej^that the actions of Homeowners, through,
its president Norman Sims and its agent William Turner, slandered
the title of Foothills Water Company to the water system and the
water right. The trial court dismissed these allegations outright.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated October 20,
1989, and again in its Order on Ownership Issues dated October 20,
1989, the court states:

"The counterclaim by Foothills Water

Company is hereby dismissed for lack of proof"

(R.897, 904).

The court obviously believed Foothills had failed to present
sufficient evidence to make out the elements of an action for
slander of title.

In Jack B. Parson Companies v. Nield, 751 P.2d

1131 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court stated the elements of slander
of title as follows:
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ADDENDUM 9
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FED oS 1S96

"-IE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

:•? APPEALS

ooOoo - - - -

Hi-Country Estates Homeowners
Association, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant: and
Cross-appellee,

QKDEP UN BRIEFINfi
Case H«

04so -I;A

Bagley & Company, a Utah
•Corporation; J. Rodney Dansie;
Gerald Bagley; Hi-Country
Estates, Inc., a dissolved
Utah corporation; Keith
Spencer; Charles E. Lewtcn;
and unknown persons claiming
an interest in Hi-Country
Estates Subdivision,
Defendants/Appellees and
Cross-appellants.
Foothills Water Company, a
Utah corporation,
Defendant/Appellee and
Cross-appellant,

Hi-Country Estates Homeowners
Association, a Utah
corporation; W Norman Sims;
and William P Turner,
Plaintiff/Appellant and
Cross-appellee.

Before Judges Davis, Billings, and Jackson.
The Court of Appeals issued an opinion herein on September
22, 1993, which is reported at 863 P.2d 1 (Utah App, 199?1
Appellee Foothills Water Company filed a petition for writ of
certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari "for the narrow purpose of reviewing the court of
appeals1 decision concerning the jurisdiction of the Public

Service Commission (PSC; as it related to issues in this case."
By a published opinion issued July 20, 1995, the Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the matter to the court of appeals as
follows:
On the basis of the foregoing, the court of
appeals' reversal of the district court's
denial of the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners
Association's motion for summary judgment on
the issue of the amount of reimbursement owed
to Foothills Water Company is reversed. The
court of appeals' determination that the
PSC's order invalidated the 1977 well lease
agreement between Bagley and Dansie is also
reversed, and this matter is remanded to' the
court of appeals for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc, v. Baaley & Company et al..
901 P.2d 1017, 1024(Utah 1995).
The following holdings contained in this courtf s opinion
were unaffected by the opinion on certiorari and, accordingly,
have been affirmed:
1. Appellant Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association
holds legal title to the water right, lots and system.
2. The case is remanded to the district court for
entry of a quiet tile order in the Homeowners
Association's favor that is not subject to any
contingency.
3. Gerald H. Bagley is not entitled to damages.
at 1019 n.2.

Id.

4. The trial court:' s dismissal of Foothills Water
Company's claim for slander of title is affirmed. Id.
at 1019 n.l.
The Supreme Courtf s opinion also concluded that the issue of
whether this court erred in reversing a district court order
permitting the Foothills Water Company to transfer water through
the system to customers within its service area but outside of
the subdivision is now moot because the water company has since
been decertified as a public utility by the PSC. Id. at 1020 n.3.
Accordingly, the only issues before the court on remand to
be briefed by the parties and determined by this court are (1)

920456-CA

2

whether the district court correctly determined the fair market
value of the water right, system and lots was $98,500 under the
theory of unjust enrichment, and (2) whether the district court
correctly held that the well lease agreement was a valid and
binding encumbrance on the water system. This court's opinion
held that the PSC's determination bearing on these issues was
dispositive and thus binding on the district court. The opinion
did not review the evidentiary basis for the district court's
valuation of the water right, system and lots and did not
determine appellant's claim that the well lease agreement had
lapsed. Accordingly, the parties shall address the following
sub-issues:
1. Whether the Utah Supreme Court's opinion r e q U i r e s
affirmance of the district court's ruling on fair
market value of the water right, system and lots and
the validity :f tho well lease as an encumbrance on the
system.
2
Whether the district court's finding, under a
theory of "unjust enrichment" that the fair market
value of the water right, system and lots is $98,500 is
clearly erroneous.
J. Whether the well lease agreement Is a valid and
binding encumbrance on the system, and in conjunction
-- therewith, whether the well lease agreement has lapsed.
Appellant filed a Motion to Decide Certain Appeal Issues on
Other Grounds, appellee filed a response, and appellant filed a
reply to appellee's response. Both parties concede that no n^'«
substantive arguments can be raised that were not included in t he
original briefs filed in this court. The discussion of facts
shall be similarly limited to those facts stated in the two
reported opinions; provided that, facts necessary to an
understanding of the issues to be briefed may be included to the
extent they are not inconsistent with the facts in the reported
opinions. Briefs that do not comply with this order are subject
to being stricken on motion or sua sponte by the court pursuant
to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT_IS_HEREBY ORDERED that appellant shall file its brief /
within thirty days of the date hereof, appellee shall thereafter
have thirty days to file a responsive brief, and appellant's
reply brief, if any, shall be filed within thirty days of the

o

filing date of appellee's brief. All briefs shall be limited to
the issues outlined and described herein.
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^ S i aday
y oof F e b r u a r y , 1996.

James- 2T. Davis-f
A s ^ ^ l a t e Presi^kfng Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certity that en February 8, 1336, a f, rue and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in f lie United States
mail to the parties listed below
SLarry R. Keller
(Argued)
Larry R. Keller & Associates
Attorney at Law for Appellant Higli u . u n t i f
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Ralph J. Marsh
(Argued)
Backman, Clark & Marsh
Attorneys at Law for Cross-Appellant Bag ley k Co.
800 Mclntrye Building
68 South Main
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Val R. Antczak
(Ar |it^ i)
T.-Patrick Casey
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
A t t o r n e y s a t Law f o r C r c s s - A p p e l '—»!•'

L

* j ' ' i ; " !,

201 South Main St., Suite 1800
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-8098
The Honorable Pat B. Brian
District Court Judge
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Third District, Salt Lake County #C85-1464
Dated this 8th day of February, 199b.

By

JU
Deputy Cler.<

M.S.

M<

^04' 0

Writ"tr

